The Sino-Russian Partnership: Cooperation without Coordination
Although Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin continue to deny they have an alliance, their partnership has deepened during the course of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, as seen in the series of summits and more frequent and extensive bilateral military exercises. Chinese officials repeatedly claim their country takes an impartial position on the war in Ukraine. Still, evidence has been accumulating in recent months of China’s growing support for Russia as far as plausible deniability allows and with only a few red lines. Nevertheless, greater policy coordination has not followed from the closer Sino-Russian partnership. Despite their alignment on geopolitical issues and common concerns about regime security, China and Russia proceed from different worldviews and they continue to pursue different agendas in adjacent regions, such as the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, as well as in their approach to the Global South, a newer arena for joint interactions.
Although Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin continue to deny they have an alliance, their partnership has deepened during the course of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine. They both see their respective countries as the victims of a U.S. strategy of “dual containment” and the target of Western interference more broadly.[1] Despite this framing, currently it is more difficult for China to claim credibly that it is a neutral party in the Russian war in Ukraine. In fact, the July 2024 NATO summit labeled China “a decisive enabler of the war in Ukraine,”[2] reflecting evidence that Sino-Russian relations are becoming more robust in the military-security sphere. During a December 2024 visit to China, Dmitry Medvedev, chairman of the United Russia Party, referred to a Chinese idiom to illustrate the current stage of relations between the two countries: “People of the same mind respond to each other, and people of the same spirit seek each other.”[3]
Nevertheless, closer military and security cooperation between China and Russia has not always translated into expanded foreign-policy coordination, nor has it supported Xi Jinping’s broader diplomatic agenda. In areas where China and Russia have been actively engaged in military exercises, such as the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, they act in parallel rather than in concert. This reflects their divergent foreign-policy priorities and histories of engagement in these regions. In the Global South they share a common anti-Western message, but not much else—Xi sees the Global South as an arena to showcase his three diplomatic initiatives, [4] whereas Putin sees an opportunity to avoid international isolation. The differences in their respective histories of interactions with developing countries, economic attributes, and political interests make it unlikely that China and Russia will coordinate their policies, especially if China aims for leadership of the Global South.
Summit Meetings Continue
Even though in March 2023 the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin due to his responsibility for war crimes in Ukraine, he continues to receive a warm welcome in Beijing. Likewise, Xi has gone ahead with visits to Russia, and a summit meeting in Moscow is being planned for 2025. The two leaders spoke via video-conferencing on January 21, 2025, just after the inauguration of Donald Trump—who seemed to be very much on both their minds. Xi spoke to Putin of their joint need to cope with the “uncertainties of the external environment” and to reinforce “the stability and resilience of China-Russia relations,” while Russian president Putin agreed that the stability of their partnership will help “counter uncertainties.”[5]
In 2024 the two leaders marked the 75th anniversary of relations between Moscow and Beijing by meeting in person on three occasions. In May 2024, the two leaders outlined a detailed blueprint for their ongoing collaboration in a wide range of areas and highlighted their areas of alignment on key international security issues in Europe, Asia, and the Global South. As in 2023, Xi and Putin insisted in a statement that they were “priority partners,” marked by a relationship that was more “advanced” than was their alliance of the Cold War era. They reiterated their adherence to China’s “3 noes” stance (no alliance, no confrontation, and no targeting of third countries).
At the July 2024 SCO meeting, Putin referred optimistically to Russia-China relations as the best in history, emphasizing their basis in equality, mutual respect, and respect for sovereignty.[6] Xi was more measured in his assessment of the international environment, noting the “turbulence of international relations,” and he urged continued determination to maintain friendship based on their unique values. Xi also stressed that the two countries should “make new efforts to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests and safeguard the basic norms governing international relations,”[7] though it is unclear from this formulation whether Xi thought Russia and China actually share these interests and norms.
The August 2024 meeting of the two prime ministers provided additional details on some of the thornier issues in Sino-Russian relations, such as China’s role in the Arctic that, until a decade ago, Russia had been slow to welcome, and Sino-Russian border issues, long a weak point in their partnership. The communiqué from that meeting notes that the two countries had formed a sub-committee on Arctic cooperation to enhance cooperation in navigation safety, polar ship-building, and transportation. The prime ministers also announced that a joint development plan for Heixiazi/Bolshoi Ussuriiskii Island had been signed in late May. This is interesting because not even a year earlier the PRC Ministry of Natural Resources had published a map showing the island as entirely Chinese, even though it had been divided evenly according to a 2004 agreement. The prime ministers also noted that discussions were continuing on the Tumen River navigation issue (in 1860 the Sino-Russian border was set 15km upstream on the Tumen River, depriving China of access to the sea), but to date no agreement has been reported.
In October 2024, the most recent visit as of this writing, Xi traveled to Russia for the BRICS summit in Kazan. In his remarks, he emphasized the enduring nature of Sino-Russian relations despite the “severe international situation,” and he urged greater cooperation in multilateral organizations.[8] Putin brought his entire cabinet with him to the meeting, likely anticipating new deals, and he again praised the Russia-China partnership as a paradigm worth emulating, especially due to its equality.[9]
So Neutral
China claims to be pursuing “an objective and impartial position” on Ukraine.[10] In reality, China plays a “hybrid” role, supporting Russia as far as plausible deniability allows, with the exception of direct sale of weapons by the Chinese government and Chinese approval of Russia’s use of weapons of mass destruction or the targeting of nuclear power plants, for which Chinese officials appear to have set a red line.[11] Chinese diplomats continue to make headlines with shuttle diplomacy, including to Kyiv, and proposals for a peace settlement, most recently the May 2024 six-point plan proposed by China and Brazil at the UN. The China-Brazil initiative is notable for specifying opposition to the use of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and battlefield nuclear weapons) and the targeting of nuclear power plants in Ukraine.[12] There is some evidence that Xi Jinping may have played a role in discouraging Putin from continuing to issue nuclear threats against Ukraine.[13] Nevertheless, some of the other proposals in the China-Brazil peace plan are less credible. In particular, despite language opposing expansion of the conflict, Chinese officials have not publicly opposed Russia’s use of North Korean troops and weaponry on the battlefield or Iran’s role in Russian drone production for Ukraine.
In response to mounting evidence of Chinese companies providing substantial material support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine, U.S. and EU officials have repeatedly urged China to end these activities, and they have sanctioned numerous Chinese companies for their role in these efforts. Chinese officials angrily reject such claims. Geng Shuang, PRC deputy representative to the UN, told the UN Security Council in January 2025: “If China had really provided military supplies to Russia, the situation on the battleground would not have been where it is now.”[14] In the event that Ukraine emerges victorious, Geng may live to regret these words—in denying any military role for China in Ukraine, he was leaving China open to criticism from Russia for not doing enough.
The Chinese government denies sending direct lethal aid to the Russian war effort in Ukraine, but Chinese companies remain the leading source of semiconductors and associated technologies sent to Russia—78 percent of Russian imports of semiconductors and 96 percent of Russian imports of smart cards have come from China.[15] Chinese firms have also sent a wide range of other dual-use items, including navigation equipment, jamming devices, aircraft parts, drones, rifles, ammunition, and trucks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Chinese companies with direct involvement in dual-use trade (in violation of the sanctions) as well as the financial entities that were set up to circumvent the sanctions on the processing of payments.[16] The evasion of sanctions also landed more than 100 Chinese companies on the U.S. Department of Commerce Entity List in 2024.[17]
In addition to sanctions, U.S. and European officials have met with their PRC counterparts on multiple occasions to warn Chinese officials against providing lethal aid to Russia. The Chinese government did impose some restrictions on drone exports to Russia during the first year of the conflict, but the sanctions now appear to have been relaxed. On December 17, the EU imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Chinese entities for their role in producing drones in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region that were destined for Russia. Drone production in Xinjiang, where PRC central authorities play a leading role in the provincial economy, pushes the boundary of direct provision of lethal aid to Russia.[18] In October 2024, the U.S. also sanctioned two companies in southeastern China for producing drones for Russia, the first time the U.S. has found evidence of Chinese firms manufacturing complete weapons systems for use in Ukraine.[19] This production effort appears to be connected to the Xinjiang venture—according to European intelligence agencies, Chinese companies based both in Xinjiang and in Shenzhen and Xiamen have supported Russian production of the Garpiya-3 long-range attack drone, similar to the U.S. Reaper.[20]
More Extensive Military and Security Cooperation
Despite Chinese remonstrations about support for Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, Sino-Russian military and security cooperation has continued to deepen. This has involved more elaborate and frequent military exercises, plans to develop joint defense systems and technologies, and gray-zone activities.
Military Exercises
Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, China and Russia have continued to engage in regular military exercises at their prewar levels of activity. For the first time, the June 2023 air patrol featured two phases, one in the Sea of Japan and another in the western Pacific, regions that a PRC military analyst has referred to as the “strategic doorsteps” of the two countries.[21] This was followed by a new joint naval exercise, Northern Cooperation, in the Sea of Japan. For the first time, in August 2023 China and Russia also participated in a joint naval patrol in the Bering Sea.
In 2024 the frequency of their exercises increased and the scale of their operations expanded. Not long after three Chinese naval vessels sailed near the Aleutian Islands in the U.S. exclusive economic zone on July 6–7, two Chinese and two Russian strategic bombers, taking off for the first time from a Russian air base in Anadyr, participated in a joint patrol near the Aleutian Islands on July 24, thus expanding the range of the Chinese aircraft. During that same week, two Chinese vessels also took part in Russia’s Navy Day celebrations in the Gulf of Finland, indicating that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was involved in activities at both ends of Russia’s Northern Sea Route bordering on the Russian Arctic.
Russia has also revived the Okean [Ocean] 2024 exercise, a large-scale 6-day naval event, which had taken place regularly during the Soviet era but had not been held since 1985. Okean 2024 involves exercises in multiple seas, with Chinese vessels participating in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk North-Joint 2024 activities as well as in a patrol in the South China Sea in Joint Sea 2024.[22] This included a 4,800-nautical miles patrol from South Korea to the South China Sea and live fire drills.[23]
Some of these exercises were ongoing activities, but others coincided with concurrent U.S. exercises with its allies, such as Arctic Defender in Alaska, RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific), and a U.S.-Philippines exercise. Nevertheless, interoperability may not be the end goal of the Sino-Russian exercises, and it remains unclear whether or to what extent China and Russia might act in support of the other. Confidence-building and joint training are more likely goals. [24] In particular, these exercises were meant to demonstrate Sino-Russian solidarity against the pressure they perceive from NATO in Ukraine, and, increasingly, in the Indo-Pacific. Their main purpose is political signaling and a show of the strength of the Sino-Russian partnership—even the U.S. Department of Defense saw limited military gains from the quickened pace and expanded scope of the Sino-Russian joint exercises, finding that they “only modestly improved their capabilities and interoperability.” [25]
Defense Systems and Technologies
Prior to the full-scale Russian war in Ukraine, China and Russia had plans for collaboration in the production of several defense systems, including ballistic missiles and a heavy-lift helicopter. It remains unclear where these plans stand now given the overall collapse of Russian arms exports since 2021.[26] Nevertheless, Russian Vice Premier Denis Manturov has claimed that the heavy-lift helicopter project is moving forward after years of preliminary talks.[27] China and Russia have also been holding regular missile defense simulations for nearly a decade, and in the past the PLA had purchased Russian missile defense systems, such as the S-400. According to Chinese defense experts, further missile-defense cooperation with Russia will help China close the gap with the U.S. and acquire technology commensurate with the PRC’s great-power status.[28] There also has been some speculation that Russia may be sharing its sensitive submarine technology with China; if true, this would pose a major challenge to the U.S.[29]
U.S. analysts caution that Russian defense collaboration with China has thus far been limited to providing support in narrow areas, such as supplying a particular component or software rather than full-fledged co-production.[30] This is because China’s increasing ability to develop its own systems now limits its needs. Since 2022, the strains on Russia’s defense sector due to the priority of the war in Ukraine have likely introduced new constraints, with the underlying concerns in Russia playing a supporting role in China’s military modernization. Sino-Russian defense cooperation notwithstanding, Chinese efforts to recruit Russian industrial spies remain a problem in the Russian defense sector. According to data from the Center for International and Security Studies, since 2021 there have been four cases of Russian experts illicitly providing aerospace and laser-technology research to China.[31]
Gray-Zone Operations
Since 2023 we have seen greater involvement by Chinese and Russian actors in gray-zone operations in Europe, acting at the very least in parallel but in some cases in concert. European intelligence officials report that Chinese espionage operations in Europe are increasingly sharing the Russian goals of undermining Western support for Ukraine and sowing division in the European democracies.[32] China has long sought to undermine European unity more overtly through policy frameworks, such as the 16+1 China and Central and Eastern Europe grouping that was formed in 2012 to engage European countries outside of European institutions. By August 2022, the grouping was down to 14+1 after the withdrawal of Latvia and Estonia. Since then, given Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war, enthusiasm has waned and suspicions in the region regarding Chinese intentions have increased.[33] At a time when China seeks to maintain its economic ties with the European countries and professes to be impartial in the Ukraine war, China’s emphasis on engaging with the most pro-Russian countries, such as Hungary and Serbia, adds to skepticism about Sino-Russian aims in Europe and supports moves to “de-risk” from Chinese supply chains.[34]
It is in the maritime domain where we have seen the biggest change in concurrent participation by Chinese and Russian gray-zone actions. Experts have been tracking the rise of Russia’s hybrid activities in Europe since 2022. At the same time, observers have documented a growing number of gray-zone actions by maritime actors linked to China in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. However, since 2023 there have been a series of cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea involving China-flagged vessels and Russia-related operations that have unnerved the Nordic and Baltic states. In the first instance, in October 2023, the Chinese government admitted responsibility for damage to the Balticconnector undersea gas pipeline, but it attributed the cable-cutting to an error by the Chinese captain of the NewNewPolarBear, a Hong Kong–flagged ship that services the Russian Northern Sea Route.[35] A second China-flagged vessel, the Yuan Peng 3, after departing from a Russian Baltic port, is suspected of sabotaging undersea cables between Sweden and Germany.[36] These incidents took place in the context of other parallel episodes of cable-cutting by the Russian shadow oil tanker fleet, enabling oil trade to proceed in circumvention of sanctions, and by Chinese merchant ships near Taiwan.[37]
At the same time, after signing an agreement for cooperation in law enforcement in April 2023, the Chinese and Russian coast guards have stepped up their collaboration in the Arctic. Vessels from the two coast guards participated in their first joint drills in September 2024 in the Sea of Japan and in October 2024 in the Bering Sea.[38] Increased Sino-Russian cooperation in maritime space, at a time of growing Chinese investments in European ports and Russian military modernization in the Arctic, has led to mounting concerns about a growing Sino-Russian threat to European maritime security.[39] Nevertheless, although providing support to Russia within the bounds of plausible deniability, Chinese officials have tried to insulate their longstanding interest in economic and diplomatic engagement with Europe from the Sino-Russian partnership, albeit not always very convincingly.
How Much Policy Coordination?
Sino-Russian military and security cooperation has centered on the Indo-Pacific region and, more recently, it has ventured into Arctic waters, but have their deepening ties led to greater policy coordination? An examination of Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic, North Korea, and the Indo-Pacific shows areas of parallel interests but also areas of real differences.
The Arctic and Energy
Sino-Russian energy trade has been expanding during the past two years. From December 2022 to December 2024, China purchased 47 percent of Russian crude oil exports, 46 percent of its coal, 27 percent of its pipeline gas, and 22 percent of its LNG. [40] Although, according to Tsinghua University Russia expert Wu Dahui,[41] Russia planned to boost oil and gas sales to China in 2025 to make up for lost market share in Europe, new sanctions on shipping are beginning to have an impact, both slowing down oil deliveries to China and impeding Chinese investments in Russian Arctic LNG. Initially, Russia sought to circumvent sanctions on its Arctic LNG projects in Yamal by relying on Chinese technologies. China also emerged as a key buyer of Arctic fossil fuels—in 2023 more than 90 percent of shipping along the Northern Sea Route was destined for China. Crude oil made up 70 percent of the cargo, with iron ore accounting for 15.5 percent and LNG accounting for 3.4 percent.[42] In 2025, Arctic oil deliveries to China have become more difficult now that the U.S. has imposed new sanctions on 180 vessels of Russia’s sanctions-evading “shadow fleet” as well as on Chinese companies producing technology for the Yamal gas projects.[43] This may lead China to reduce the amount of oil it purchases, at least by maritime transport, and to scale back investments in the Russian Arctic.
Although China is slated to increase the amount of pipeline gas it receives from Russia from the Power of Siberia pipeline in eastern Siberia, plans for a second gas pipeline—Power of Siberia 2—to eastern China via Mongolia have not advanced despite Putin’s efforts to conclude a deal to send additional gas to China. The pipeline was not mentioned in the 2024 meetings between Russia and China, even though in an October 2023 interview with PRC media Putin was optimistic about concluding an agreement.[44] He even brought the heads of Gazprom (the Russian state gas monopoly) and Rosneft (the Russian state oil monopoly) to Beijing for the third Belt and Road summit, but no deal was reached at that time or since.[45] There is some evidence of discussions of rerouting the pipeline to transit, instead or in addition, through Kazakhstan,[46] but energy experts argue that China may be weighing the risks of a second overland pipeline from Russia versus maritime LNG purchases from other exporters. Moreover, China may not need the additional volume of gas for another decade, giving Chinese officials time to ponder the alternatives—and to negotiate a better deal on gas prices.[47]
North Korea
Just one month after the Sino-Russian summit, Putin signed an agreement with Kim Jong-un that paved the way for the use of North Korean troops in Ukraine, now reported to number 11,000 (although, as of this writing, as many as 4,000 may have suffered casualties). The June 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation provides mutual assistance, including military aid, in case of attack on either of the signatories as well as joint activities to strengthen defense capabilities.[48] Beginning in late 2022, North Korea began supplying ammunition for the Russian war effort. Estimates of the quantity of shells vary—between 2 and 6 million—and there have been reports that many shells had deteriorated to the point of their being completely unusable. Yet, even with a large number of defective shells, the influx of North Korean ammunition enabled Russia to sustain its military operations at a time when Ukraine was facing acute shortages.[49] By January 2024, North Korea was also supplying Russia with ballistic missiles and launchers.[50] Although North Korean military support for Russia relieves some pressure on China to provide more support in Ukraine,[51] the closer ties between Russia and North Korea pose new challenges for the Chinese leadership.
The Chinese government has been remarkably silent on North Korea’s role in Ukraine, to the point of disavowing any knowledge about Russia–North Korean defense ties. Thus, at a November 1, 2024, press conference, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that “China is not aware of the specifics of bilateral exchanges and cooperation between the DPRK and Russia.”[52] Considering the regular Sino-Russian security dialogues, including separate talks focusing specifically on Asian security issues, this is difficult to believe. If true, it would indicate a shocking lack of transparency in the Sino-Russian partnership. North Korea’s participation in the Russian war in Ukraine would seem to contradict China’s position against outside interference and expansion of the war. U.S. officials have expressed concern to China about North Korea’s growing role in the conflict, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry has refused to comment on the issue, claiming that “China’s policy on the Ukrainian crisis and the Korean peninsula is consistent.”[53]
China celebrated the 75th anniversary of its relations with North Korea in 2024. Although the two countries planned to highlight their “friendship year,” their relations instead took a downturn. No summit meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and PRC president Xi Jinping took place. An anticipated loan agreement whereby China was to provide North Korea with food aid in exchange for access to strategic minerals was never concluded.[54] There are also reports that China has been reneging on cooperation with North Korea to repatriate illegal migrants.[55] North Korea, for its part, although depending on China for more than 90 percent of its trade, appears to be downplaying its relationship with China while highlighting the new North Korea–Russia partnership.[56] In economic terms, China has considerable leverage over North Korea, but it has been reluctant to use it for fear of destabilizing its economy and creating a wave of refugees into China. This reluctance puts Beijing at a disadvantage at a time of political turmoil in South Korea when there could be an opportunity to improve relations with a new government in Seoul and the potential of a weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance.[57]
The Indo-Pacific
The increased number of Sino-Russian military exercises in the Indo-Pacific raises questions about their purpose. Are they seeking to improve interoperability, and, if so, to what end? Putin has supported China’s “Taiwan principle” in every joint agreement, but Russia’s likely role in a future Chinese military operation in Taiwan remains unknown. Involvement by Russian and Chinese actors in cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea certainly raises the possibility of support from Russian vessels for similar Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait. China has been echoing Russian disinformation on the war in Ukraine, suggesting that Sino-Russian cooperation in a Taiwan-related information strategy is possible. Indeed, there is evidence of substantial coordination between Russia and China in the disinformation sphere, especially on Ukraine.[58] However, the PRC seems eager to overstate the degree of Russian support for Chinese positions on Taiwan, possibly indicating some degree of dissatisfaction. The PRC Foreign Ministry readout of the May 2024 summit meeting states that “Russia reiterated its adherence to the one-China principle, recognized Taiwan as an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. …”[59] The Kremlin statement from the same meeting sticks to the standard phrasing, recognizing “Taiwan as an inalienable part of China. …”[60] i.e., historical China, rather than stating as explicitly as the Chinese text that Taiwan is a part of the current PRC.
The increased number of Sino-Russian military exercises in East Asia, especially in Northeast Asia but also including some patrols in uncontested areas of the South China Sea, raises questions about closer alignment between Chinese and Russian officials on Indo-Pacific issues. To be sure, there is a certain amount of signaling going on—China and Russia have been responding to increased NATO attention to the region as well as to a series of military exercises by the U.S. and its allies. Some of the Sino-Russian joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific are regular iterations of naval exercises. Beyond that, however, their need for greater interoperability is less clear as they continue to display parallel rather than overlapping regional interests. Russia continues to maintain its close traditional ties with India and Vietnam even though these countries have challenging relations with China. Although Putin met with Xi in 2024 on two occasions, he also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on two occasions (in July and October 2024) and traveled to Vietnam in June 2024 on a state visit. Regarding the South China Sea, Russia has avoided explicitly siding with China—the May 2024 joint statement reads that “The Russian side supports the efforts of China and ASEAN countries to jointly defend peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[61]
China, Russia, and the Global Order
Although in many respects policy coordination between China and Russia is more aspiration than reality despite their deepening military-security cooperation, their parallel rhetoric on the Global South supports their message of strategic interaction. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, Russia and China have been successful in broadening the appeal of BRICS, now including Indonesia and potentially Malaysia. Apart from arms and energy sales, however, Russia has long failed to convince the East Asian states that it is serious about engaging with them—BRICS seems to have provided Russian diplomats with a new message about an alternative model of world order that resonates in some Indo-Pacific countries.[62]
For China, this is both a welcome and a challenging development—and a subject of debate among Chinese scholars, even in China’s more restrictive environment today. For Feng Shaolei, a prominent Russia scholar at East China Normal University, China can take advantage of Russia’s greater emphasis on engagement with East Asia and the Pacific by collaborating on trade routes through the Russian Far East and Russian Arctic ports. In Feng’s view, this would enable China to support globalizing trends (and Xi’s concept of a community of common destiny) through regional cooperation despite geopolitical divides.[63] Zhao Huasheng, a leading expert on Russia at Fudan University, notes that Russia and China have different understandings of globalization and global order, with Russia emphasizing anti-Western approaches and China highlighting inclusiveness—albeit within a (China-led) community of common destiny.[64]
For China, the challenge is to find areas of cooperation with Russia while avoiding the appearance of fully subscribing to its anti-Western rhetoric, at least with respect to economic interests. China’s initiative in the UN to engage with the Friends for Peace in the Global South, for example, gives the appearance that China’s position on Ukraine finds international support. Feng Yujun, a professor of Russian history at Peking University and one of the most prominent critical voices in China on Russia’s war in Ukraine, is skeptical that Russia’s diplomacy in the Global South will succeed in reversing Russian isolation or substantially improving the international climate.[65] If Russia remains isolated, this means that China has attached itself in a strategic partnership to an international pariah, at the same time as Xi is seeking to place China at the center of global development and security initiatives.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has boosted Sino-Russian cooperation in the military and security spheres, but, thus far, greater policy coordination has not followed. Despite their alignment on geopolitical issues and their common concerns about regime security, China and Russia proceed from different worldviews and continue to pursue different agendas in adjacent regions, such as the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Global South.
About the Contributor
Elizabeth Wishnick is senior research scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses and senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. She was a tenured professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005 to 2024. Dr. Wishnick has dual Chinese and Russian regional expertise and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics. Her book project, China’s Risk: Energy, Water, Food and Regional Security (forthcoming, Columbia University Press) addresses the security consequences of energy, water, and food risks in China for its Eurasian neighbors, a topic she explores in a related policy blog, https://www.chinasresourcerisks.com/, now on Substack as China’s Resource Risks. She received her PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, her MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and her BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French.
She would like to thank Samuel Robertson for his research and editorial assistance.
Notes
[1] 中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦在两国建交75周年之际关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文）[Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination in the New Era on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Two Countries (Full Text)], May 16, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml.
[2] Washington Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.
[3]习近平会见梅德韦杰夫：中俄两国互为最大邻国 发展友好关系具有必然历史逻辑和强大内生动力 [Xi Jinping Meets with Medvedev: China and Russia Are Each Other's Largest Neighbors. Developing Friendly Relations Has Inevitable Historical Logic and a Strong Endogenous Driving Force], Guancha, December 12, 2024,
https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2024_12_12_758618.shtml.
[4] These are the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. On the response to Chinese and Russian efforts in the Global South, see Prashanth Parameswaren, “Rising Global South Discontent Amid Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond,” Wilson Center, August 9, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/rising-global-south-discontent-amid-strategic-competition-indo-pacific-and-beyond.
[5] “Talk with President of China Xi Jinping,” Kremlin, President of Russia, January 21, 2025, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76137; “Update: Xi Speaks with Putin, Calling on China, Russia to Uphold Int'l Fairness, Justice,” Xinhua, January 22, 2025,
https://english.news.cn/20250122/468e369d73c44dc4826cabea15dd6c83/c.html.
[6] “Meeting with President of China Xi Jinping,” Kremlin, President of Russia, July 3, 2024, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74461.
[7] “Xi Urges China, Russia to Continue Strengthening Alignment of Development Strategies,” Xinhua, July 4, 2024, http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2024-07/04/c_1001681.htm.
[8] “Xi Jinping Holds Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 23, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202410/t20241025_11516002.html.
[9] “Meeting with President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping,” Kremlin, President of Russia, October 22, 2024,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75370.
[10] “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for The Summit of the Future and the 79th Session of The United Nations General Assembly,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 19, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjzc/202409/t20240920_11493896.html.
[11] Lukian de Boni, “‘Hybrid Support’? Sino-Russian Relations Amidst War in Ukraine,” European Guanxi, June 18, 2024,
https://www.europeanguanxi.com/post/hybrid-support-sino-russian-relations-amidst-war-in-ukraine.
[12]“Brazil and China Present Joint Proposal for Peace Negotiations with the Participation of Russia and Ukraine,” gov.br, May 23, 2024,
[13] “Antony Blinken: ‘China Has Been Trying to Have It Both Ways,’” Financial Times, January 3, 2025,
https://www.ft.com/content/25798b9f-1ad9-4f7f-ab9e-d6f36bbe3edf.
[14] Cited in “If China Had Provided Military Supplies to Russia, Situation on The Battleground Would Not Have Been Where It Is Now: Chinese Ambassador to UN In Response to US,” Global Times, January 13, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202501/1327080.shtml.
[15] “Russia Semiconductor Imports Dashboard: Pre and Post Invasion Trends,” Silverado Policy Accelerator, August 24, 2023, https://silverado.org/data-dashboards/russia-semiconductor-imports-dashboard-pre-and-post-invasion-trends/; Dmitry Gorenburg, Paul Schwartz, Brian Waidelich, and Elizabeth Wishnick, with contributions by Mary Chesnut and Brooke Lennox, “Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation,” CNA, March 2023, 33, https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/Russian-Chinese-Military-Cooperation.pdf.
[16] “Treasury Disrupts Russia’s Sanctions Evasion Schemes,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 15, 2025,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2785. Also see Gorenburg et al., “Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation,” 87.
[17] Eleanor Hume and Rowan Scarpino, “Sanctions by the Numbers: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations’ Sanctions and Export Controls on China,” Center for a New American Security, October 23, 2024,
[18] Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Has ‘Conclusive’ Proof of Armed Drones for Russia Being Made in China: Sources,” South China Morning Post, November 15, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3286819/eu-has-conclusive-proof-armed-drones-russia-being-made-china-sources.
[19] Nectar Gan, “US Imposes First Sanctions on Chinese Firms for Making Weapons for Russia’s War in Ukraine,” CNN, October 18, 2024,
[20]“Exclusive: Russia Has Secret War Drones Project in China, Intel Sources Say,” Reuters, September 25, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/.
[21] Guo Yuandan, “China-Russia Joint Air Strategic Patrol ‘At Their Doorsteps’ Completely Normal: Expert,” Global Times, November 30, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1324090.shtml.
[22] Sergey Sukhankin, “Sino-Russian Partnership in the Arctic and the Far East Reflect Joint Security Interests (Part One), Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 21, no. 166 (November 14, 2024),
[23] Dzirhan Mahadzir, “UPDATED: Joint Russian, Chinese Pacific Bomber Flight Prompts Japan and South Korea to Scramble Fighters,” U.S. Naval Institute, December 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/11/29/joint-russian-chinese-pacific-bomber-flight-prompts-japan-and-south-korea-to-scramble-fighters.
[24] “Recent Developments in Sino-Russian Relations: A Conversation with Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick,” ChinaPower (CSIS), August 28, 2024, https://chinapower.csis.org/?s=wishnick.
[25] U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Annual Report to Congress, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF. P. 15.
[26] John C.K. Daly, “Russian Arms Exports Collapse by 92 Percent as Military-Industrial Complex Fails,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 22, no. 3 (January 15, 2025),
[27] “Russian Helicopters Developing Systems for China’s New Heavy Helo,” Aviation Week, May 21, 2024, https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/russian-helicopters-developing-systems-chinas-new-heavy-helo.
[28] Cited in Tong Zhao and Dmitry Stefanovich, “Managing the Impact of Missile Defense on U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2023,
[29] Patrick Tucker, “Russian Submarine Tech Could Help China Outpace US: INDOPACOM,” Defense One, November 23, 2024,
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/11/russian-submarine-tech-could-help-china-out-pace-us-says-indopacom-chief/401270/; Sarah Kirchberger and Christopher P. Carlson, “Is Russia Helping China Build a Hybrid-Nuclear Submarine?” The Maritime Executive, January 26, 2025,
https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/is-russia-helping-china-with-hybrid-nuclear-submarine.
[30] Gorenburg et al., “Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation,” 35.
[31]“How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?” ChinaPower (CSIS), August 7, 2024,
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/.
[32] Nicholas Vinocur, “‘Dragon-Bear’: How China and Russia’s Spy Operations Overlap in Europe,” Politico, September 13, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/dragon-bear-how-china-and-russias-spy-operations-overlap-in-europe/.
[33] Patrick Triglavcanin, “Central Europeans Are Turning Away from the CEE-China Initiative,” Euractiv, July 18, 2023,
[34] Yu Jie, “ Xi Jinping Hopes to Improve EU–China Relations – And Drive a Wedge Between Europe and the US,” Chatham House, May 9, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/xi-jinping-hopes-improve-eu-china-relations-and-drive-wedge-between-europe-and-us.
[35] Finbarr Bermingham, “Beijing Admits Hong Kong-Flagged Ship Destroyed Key Baltic Gas Pipeline ‘By Accident,’” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2024,
[36] Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Vessel Suspected of Damaging European Submarine Cables,” The Diplomat, November 22, 2024,
https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/chinese-vessel-suspected-of-damaging-european-submarine-cables/.
[37] Reid Standish, “Baltic Sea Incidents Put Spotlight On Russia's 'Shadow' Fleet,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 25, 2025,
https://www.rferl.org/a/baltic-sea-sabotage-undersea-cables-russian-shadow-fleet/33290689.html.
[38]Meia Nouwens and Veerle Nouwens, “China-Russia Coast Guard Cooperation: A New Dimension of China-Russia Relations?” ChinaPower (CSIS), October 16, 2024,
https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/china-russia-coast-guard-cooperation/; John Grady, “China Coast Guard Now Operating in the Bering Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute, October 3, 2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/10/03/china-coast-guard-now-operating-in-the-bering-sea.
[39] Philippe Le Corre, “The Beijing-Moscow Axis: Evolving European Perspectives,“ Asia Society Policy Institute, October 11, 2024,
https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/beijing-moscow-axis-evolving-european-perspectives.
[40] Vaibhav Raghunandan and Petras Katinas, “December 2024 — Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions,” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, January 12, 2025,
[41] Daisy Xu, Cindy Liang, and Oceana Zhou, “Russia to Increase Oil, Gas Exports to China in 2025 to Sustain Income: Tsinghua,” S&P Global, December 13, 2024,
[42] Malte Humpert, “China Pushes Northern Sea Route Transit Cargo to New Record,” High North News, December 18, 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-pushes-northern-sea-route-transit-cargo-new-record.
[43] Malte Humpert, “US Slaps Sanctions on Chinese Yard Wison For Supplying Technology to Arctic LNG 2,” QCaptain, January 13, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/us-slaps-chinese-yard-wison-with-sanctions-for-supplying-technology-to-arctic-lng-2/.
[44] “News Conference Following the Visit to China,” Kremlin, President of Russia, October 18, 2023, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/72.
[45] Joseph Webster, “The Xi-Putin meeting: A United Front but Troubles on the Horizon,” The Diplomat, October 20, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/the-xi-putin-meeting-a-united-front-but-troubles-on-the-horizon/.
[46] Nikolai Kuzmin, “Как война в Украине повлияет на транзит газа через Казахстан” [How the War in Ukraine Influences the Transit of Gas via Kazakhstan], Freedom Broker, January 25, 2025, https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-01-23/print1068-nklk-gaz/.
[47] Erica Downs, Akos Locz, and Tatiana Mitrova, “The Future of the Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline,” Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, May 15, 2024, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/the-future-of-the-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline/.
[48] “DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” KCNA Watch, June 20, 2024,
[49] Keith Johnson, “North Korean Shells Fuel Russia’s War—and Kim’s Ambitions,” FP, October 3, 2024,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/03/north-korea-russia-weapons-arms-ukraine-war/.
[50] “North Korea Supplied Russia With Ballistic Missiles for Use Against Ukraine, White House Says,” VOA News, January 4, 2024,
[51] Jacob Stokes, “China Is Just Fine with North Korean Troops in Ukraine,” Center for a New American Security, January 16, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/china-is-just-fine-with-north-korean-troops-in-ukraine.
[52] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on November 1, 2024, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202411/t20241101_11519937.html.
[53] 2024年10月30日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会
[Regular Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian on October 30, 2024], PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 30, 2024,
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202410/t20241030_11518445.shtml.
[54] Seulkee Jang, “China in Talks with N. Korea about Providing Raw Materials and Food,” Daily NK, May 3, 2024,
https://www.dailynk.com/english/china-in-talks-with-n-korea-about-providing-raw-materials-and-food/.
[55] Seohyun Lee and Michael Donmoyer, “How China-North Korea Relations Frayed in 2024, and What It Means for Trump's Korea Policy,” UPI, December 17, 2024,
[56]“China-North Korea Trade Falls 5% in 2024 Despite 75th Anniv. of Ties,” Kyodo News, January 19, 2025,
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/01/0c29b4b137f6-china-n-korea-trade-falls-5-in-2024-despite-75th-anniv-of-ties.html?phrase=koike%20&words=; Cao Xin and Cao Zhong, “China-North Korea Relations Start the New Year on a New Low,” South China Morning Post, January 7, 2025,
[57] Christy Lee, “Analysts: South Korea's Political Turmoil Works In China's Favor,” VOA News, January 3, 2025,
[58] Niklas Swanström and Andrew Scobell, “Ukraine: The Inflection Point in the China-Russia Axis,” December 19, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/12/ukraine-inflection-point-china-russia-axis.
[59]中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦在两国建交75周年之际关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文), May 16, 2024,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml.
[60]Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики об углублении отношений всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающих в новую эпоху, в контексте 75-летия установления дипломатических отношений между двумя странами [Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Relations Entering a New Era in the Context of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Two Countries], May 16, 2024,
http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6132.
[61]中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦在两国建交75周年之际关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文), May 16, 2024,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml; Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики об углублении отношений всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающих в новую эпоху, в контексте 75-летия установления дипломатических отношений между двумя странами, May 16, 2024, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6132.
[62] Alexander Baunov, “New Identity for BRICS,” Carnegie Politika, October 31, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/10/brics-russia-global-power-opposition?lang=en; Natalie Sabanadze, “Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – And It Is Working,” Chatham House, May 16, 2024,
[63] Feng Shaolei, “Global Transformation, the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, and Sino-Russian Relations,” Interpret: China (CSIS), February 28, 2024,
[64] Zhao Huasheng, “Three Core Concepts of Sino-Russian International Cooperation,” Russian International Affairs Council, September 30, 2024, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/three-core-concepts-of-sino-russian-international-cooperation/.
[65]Feng Yujun, “The Russian Situation under Prolonged Warfare,” Interpret: China (CSIS), January 5, 2024, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-russian-situation-under-prolonged-warfare/.
Photo credit: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
