Organizing American Policy Around “Peak China” is a Bad Bet

Ryan Hass CLM Issue 81 September 2024

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China’s leaders confront mounting internal and external headwinds to their country’s continuing rise. At home, Beijing’s economic engine is sputtering. Abroad, countries are pushing back against Chinese attempts to export its way to economic growth.  On the security front, countries are banding together to guard against China’s expansion in military capabilities. This confluence of challenges has caused some American analysts to declare the end of China’s rise and warn that Beijing could lash out militarily before it begins its downturn in national power. China’s leaders explicitly reject suggestions that the country’s best days are behind it. They believe China’s path to greater global influence is widening as America’s dominance in the international system wanes. It would be a mistake to organize American policy around “peak China” theory. The United States and China are locked in a long-term competition for global influence. This competition ultimately will turn on national performance. That is where America’s policy focus must reside for the United States to preserve its privileged position in the world.

China faces a serious and growing array of domestic and external challenges. Economic indicators are anemic. For example, credit growth is weak. Private firms are pulling back from new capital expenditures. The country’s banking system is not productively allocating money to the most efficient and growth-oriented sectors of the economy. Instead, China’s leaders are channeling savings from families into factories to spur advanced manufacturing and concentrate resources in national priority sectors. This state-directed approach is leading to lower employment growth and high levels of youth unemployment.  

China’s annual growth rate has halved since the period prior to President Xi’s promotion to leader, from 10 percent in 2009–2012 to around 5 percent today. Seventy percent of private wealth in China is invested in the property sector, which is in the doldrums.[1] China’s stock market is dramatically underperforming its peers around the world. Since 2021, China’s stock market indices have lost over $6 trillion in value. During this same period, the U.S. stock market has added over $5 trillion in value.[2]

China also faces significant demographic challenges in the coming decades. The country has seen a steepening decline in its birth and natural growth rate, with the natural population change dipping into the negatives in 2022 and 2023. According to Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “Between 2020 and 2035, China will lose roughly 70 million working-age adults and gain 130 million senior citizens. That’s a France-sized population of consumers, taxpayers, and workers gone—and a Japan-sized population of pensioners added—in 15 years.”[3]

Source: “National Bureau of Statistics of China 2023,” China Statistical Yearbook 2023, September 2023, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/ndsj/2023/indexeh.htm.

As this demographic transition unfolds, China’s worker-to-retiree ratio will skew, placing a heavy drag on government finances as more resources are devoted to caring for retirees. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate that the old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of people aged 65 and older to the number of people aged 15–64) will rise from 21 percent in 2023 to 52 percent by 2050, meaning that more than one-half of the population will be retired and drawing resources for care.[4]

As labor force participation goes down, there will be downward pressures on productivity. Already, China is facing declining labor productivity rates and a smaller labor force participation rate, which is putting a drag on overall growth. Many of the gains from urbanization have already been realized. Downward trends may intensify in the coming years as the effects of malnutrition and cognitive delay, as well as uneven access to educational and vocational training, show up in the data.[5]

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China; Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security; “China Labour Productivity Growth, 1953–2024,” CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/labour-productivity-growth.

China also confronts a ballooning debt challenge. Local governments bear responsibility for providing many of the social services in China, even as the central government collects most tax revenue. Local governments previously relied upon land sales to developers to meet nearly one- third of their revenue requirements. But as China’s real estate sector has imploded, land sales have plummeted, dragging down the local governments’ capacity to generate revenue and leading local governments in many parts of the country to trim salaries and essential services.[6] The hidden debt of local governments amounts to 70 trillion yuan ($9.8 trillion), more than twice Germany's GDP. China’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio climbed to 288 percent in 2023, a record level and 13.7 percent above the previous year.[7]

Source:  National Institute for Finance & Development, 官方网站, http://www.nifd.cn/home/indexen.

President Xi Jinping made anti-corruption a hallmark of his leadership when he took power in 2013. Despite a concerted campaign, over a decade later China’s top echelons still remain mired in corruption. In June 2024, Xi convened his military top brass for a symbolic conference in Yan’an, the founding stronghold of the Chinese Communist Party, to exhort military leaders to demonstrate greater discipline.[8] Xi lamented the “deep-seated problems” in China’s military leadership following the purge of nine top leaders, including the former head of the PLA’s Rocket Force and two former defense ministers.[9] Xi’s hand-selected foreign minister, Qin Gang, also suffered an unceremonious demotion from his position after only seven months in the job.[10]

China also faces external headwinds. After it experienced a relatively benign external environment during its multi-decade rise from 1979–2016, Beijing now confronts growing external obstacles to its continued rise. It faces growing constraints to accessing high-end technological inputs, such as leading-edge chips and related manufacturing capabilities, due to tightening export controls by the advanced democracies that supply these products. This trend is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. The United States also has announced an outbound investment screening mechanism to complement its existing inbound screening mechanism, which has increasingly scrutinized Chinese investments into the United States.[11]

Furthermore, China’s strategy of exporting its way out of its domestic challenges is running up against opposition from a widening number of countries. There is growing backlash in the United States, the European Union, Indonesia, Brazil, and elsewhere against Chinese state-directed efforts to boost manufacturing for exports to support growth.[12] 

On top of this, countries across Asia are boosting defense spending and energizing cooperation to counter China’s growing military might. In addition to U.S.-led efforts, such as the Quadrilateral Group (Australia, India, Japan, and United States) and the AUKUS alliance (Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States), there is significant momentum among Asian countries to enhance interoperability and to strengthen coordination in defense of the regional commons. The cumulative effect of these efforts has been to limit China’s prospects for securing greater deference to its preferences for ordering Asia or for acquiescence to its territorial claims.[13]

In reviewing these trends, American scholars Michael Beckley and Hal Brands have concluded that they see the end of China’s rise.[14] They warn that China may be the next in a historical pattern of authoritarian powers lashing out before entering a cycle of national decline. As past examples, they cite Germany’s decision to wage World War I in a gasp for hegemony and Japan’s launch of World War II in Asia to prevent America from suffocating its empire.

Such is the work of grand strategists who seem unconcerned about understanding China’s own vision and its strategies for securing it. Proponents of “peak China theory” treat the country as an inanimate object that is being blown off course by immutable historic forces. They assume that Beijing’s national ambitions resemble those of past rising powers that ran up against forces opposing their goals. Such analyses overlook the fact that China has agency. China’s leaders also maintain their own internal narratives and metrics for measuring progress in pursuit of their national objectives. 

If any forecast of China acting as a peaking power is to hold explanatory value, there must be evidence that China’s leaders accept the diagnosis of their current condition and feel an urgency to act before their moment at the apex of national power passes. In the case of China today, no such evidence is available, at least not in the public record. To the contrary, and even despite all the headwinds previously discussed, China’s leaders appear—outwardly at least—bullish about the country’s prospects. President Xi and those around him believe the path to China’s national goals is widening, or at a minimum, it is not closing. 

The View from Beijing

Interpreting Beijing’s day-to-day policy direction often involves more art than science. As more power becomes concentrated around Xi and his inner circle, policy decisions—and their inputs— are growing more opaque. Nevertheless, through long-term observation of influential publications, state media op-eds, official remarks, and—importantly—consistent, candid, private communications with Chinese experts and policy participants, it is still possible to build a composite framework for gauging the direction of policy travel. The picture that emerges from such an analysis is that of a top leadership in Beijing that has grown more sober to domestic and external challenges, but one that remains confident and determined about progress toward the country’s long-term national goals.

Xi’s tenure as leader began a bit triumphal. In the rough equivalent of an inaugural address, Xi told the CCP Central Committee:

Facts have repeatedly told us that Marx and Engels’s analysis of the basic contradiction of capitalist society is not outdated, nor is the historical materialist view that capitalism will inevitably perish and socialism will inevitably triumph outdated. This is the irreversible overall trend of social and historical development, but the road is winding. The ultimate demise of capitalism, and ultimate triumph of socialism, will inevitably be a long historical process. [15]

In the years since, Xi has spoken repeatedly about pursuing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He describes this process as a “historic mission” and an “inevitability,” which will lead to a resurgent China that is prosperous, strong, powerful, and a central actor in the international system.[16]

China’s top leaders and state media have argued that historic tailwinds are propelling China toward its national destiny. Among these are “changes not seen in a century,” a term that Xi has invoked on multiple occasions since 2017. The context of the usage of this term has evolved over the past seven years as China’s international environment has shifted. For example, Xi told ambassadors assembled for China’s 2018 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference:

Currently, China is in the best development period since modern times, while the world is undergoing profound changes not seen in a century. These two factors are interwoven and mutually influential. There are many favorable international conditions for conducting foreign affairs now and in the future. [17]

As U.S.-China relations grew more tense in 2019, Xi’s invocations of “changes not seen in a century” became more nuanced to capture the mix of risks and opportunities that China confronted. For example, in a speech to provincial and ministerial-level leaders on January 21, 2019, Xi observed:

Currently, unprecedented world changes are accelerating and profoundly evolving, the sources of global turbulence and risk points are increasing, and China’s external environment is complex and harsh. We must coordinate the domestic and international situations and the two main issues of development and security, focus on the key points while taking the overall situation into account and effectively prevent various kinds of risk linkages.”[18]

In his statement on the Third Plenum on July 18, Xi again invoked the term: “As the world undergoes rapid changes not seen in a century, with frequent local conflicts and turmoil, worsening global issues, and escalating external suppression and containment, China is entering a period where strategic opportunities coexist with risks and challenges, and unpredictable factors are increasing.”[19]

This brief review of Xi’s evolving invocation of the concept of great changes offers insight into how China’s leaders are evaluating their country’s strategic environment. While not static, Beijing’s assessment has consistently emphasized the opportunities China enjoys to advance along a continuum toward its national ambitions while also becoming more concrete in acknowledging the obstacles that must be overcome.

Outside of leader-level pronouncements, Chinese public commentators and state media are often more bullish in their assessments of China’s strategic standing. For example, following China’s hosting of a meeting to mediate between Palestinian parties in Beijing in July 2024, Dr. Zhu Weilie, an honorary director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, assessed:

We are now going through great changes not seen in a century. In other words, this suggests that chaos is raging and that the east is rising and the west is declining, or that China is rising and the US and the West are declining. In these changes, the Global South’s power is emerging; a sense of autonomy and solidarity is emerging not only in China but also throughout the Global South. I believe that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as a major issue amid the qualitative changes we are witnessing, could be a turning point for the course of the great changes; it will determine whether or not global governance improves and whether or not the international order becomes more fair and just.[20] 

Based on this author’s recent private exchanges with Chinese officials, former officials, and policy experts at government-affiliated think tanks, Dr. Zhu’s comments reflect a mainstream view among China’s leadership that the east is in relative ascendance and the west is in relative decline.[21] Chinese counterparts often emphasize privately that China’s evaluation of ongoing power shifts in the international system is broader than just competition between Beijing and Washington, but it is also inclusive of it. They argue that China is gaining influence and building inroads across the world, while America’s standing is eroding, particularly following America’s staunch support for Israel after it retaliated for the October 7, 2023, attack. As the world becomes less unipolar and power becomes more diffuse, according to their logic, there is more room for China to pursue a greater role in the international system.   

While it is widely accepted within China’s policy community that America is in decline, there are variations in assessments of this trend. As Chinese foreign policy expert Yu Jie has categorized, there are three schools of thought in China regarding America’s decline.[22] The first are “international pessimists,” who warn Chinese leaders not to underestimate America’s resilience. This group includes many of China’s leading experts on the U.S., such as Yan Xuetong, Wang Jisi, Cui Tiankai, and Da Wei. The second group is made up of “cautious optimists,” who believe America is in decline not only due to China’s rise but also due to domestic dysfunction in the United States. The third group includes “ultra optimists” who believe that Beijing will outpace Washington due to China’s growing diplomatic, economic, military, and technological power. Yu Jie assesses that China’s policies are informed by all three schools of thought.[23] 

To be clear, Xi and his top lieutenants do not expect America to go the way of the United Kingdom and gracefully cede global leadership to China. They expect Washington to challenge China’s ascent and to enlist its partners in efforts to constrain China’s rise. Xi registered frustration with this trend in a March 6, 2023, speech to Beijing’s annual “Two Sessions,” when he complained: “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement, and suppression of China. This has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”[24] 

Frustration is a far cry from panic over peaking, however. On a range of metrics, China’s leaders believe they are gaining momentum toward their national goals. In terms of diplomatic reach, China boasts the most overseas embassies and consulates in the world, exceeding America’s presence in Africa and East Asia by a sizable margin.[25] In military terms, China is significantly ramping up exchanges, exercises, port calls, and senior-level exchanges around the world.[26] In terms of shipbuilding, China is setting the pace. The PLA Navy is the largest navy in the world by count of surface vessels. China’s shipyards produced more than 26 million tons of merchant ships in 2023, which is 40 percent more than the United States produced at the peak of its national production during World War II.[27] China is the world’s largest trading power, and 93 economies currently count Beijing as their top trading partner.[28] China is also making inroads as a preferred partner for strengthening other governments’ internal security practices. Through technology exports and knowledge transfer, Beijing is supporting governments that seek greater control over their populations. In the process, China is normalizing its own domestic security practices by making them more commonly adopted around the world.[29] 

Beijing is attracting growing international support for Xi’s three signature initiatives, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. While skeptics of these initiatives view them as slogans in search of a strategy, to Chinese policymakers and analysts, the growing acceptance of these initiatives serves as a yardstick of progress toward greater Chinese leadership on the world stage.[30] In addition, the BRICS grouping continues to gain clout, with additional prospective members coming forward to express interest in joining, in part to increase their linkages with China. 

These and other developments have led China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, to proclaim: “The rise of emerging markets and developing countries has become unstoppable. The ‘Global South’ has significantly strengthened, and the influence of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has notably increased. The trends of world multipolarity and democratization of international relations are irreversible.”[31] In other words, Beijing believes it is achieving progress in decentering the United States within the international system and opening space for China to play a larger role.

China’s diplomacy has demonstrated dexterity in seeking to mitigate a risk that Chinese strategic planners often cite—encirclement by the United States and its partners. In recent months, Chinese leaders have lowered tensions with Vietnam, pursued rapprochement with Australia and New Zealand, stabilized relations with Japan and South Korea, and set a goal of reducing tensions with India.[32] Rightly or not, Chinese officials also expect European commercial interests in China’s market will mitigate the exacerbation of Sino-EU tensions after the conflict in Ukraine subsides.[33]

Closer to home, China’s leaders recently ratified their current economic course at the CCP’s Third Plenum. The Party Group of the National Bureau of Statistics assesses, “China’s economic development faces more favorable conditions than unfavorable factors. …The fundamental trend of economic recovery and long-term growth remains unchanged.”[34] 

Even allowing for such rosy forecasts, China’s leaders have begun working to deprioritize GDP growth as a barometer and instead to measure economic performance on the more qualitative level of achieving progress in “broad economic and social goals.”[35] To advance these goals, Xi has emphasized “new quality productive forces,” a concept prioritizing a technology-centric, industrial policy-driven growth strategy.[36] China’s global dominance in emerging sectors, such as electric vehicles, batteries, solar, wind, and commercial drones, serve as proof points for Xi and others that China remains capable of operating at the frontier of innovation in fields it prioritizes, even if these fields on their own are insufficient to propel a $17 trillion economy.    

Xi has identified the coming period as critical for building toward China’s centennial goal of amassing national strength and international influence by the middle of this century.[37] He clearly has a vision of greatness for his country. He stokes nationalism, which helps focus public attention on the horizon and dilutes scrutiny of the present. He also regularly extols the need for China to maintain confidence in its course, just as he did at the Symposium on Cultural Inheritance and Development in 2023, when he declared:

Confidence leads to strength. A nation with cultural confidence can stand firm, remain stable, and progress far. The continuity of Chinese civilization over thousands of years, enduring through numerous trials and tribulations, is a miracle of human civilization and the foundation of our self-assurance. [38]

In a meeting with U.S. business executives in Beijing on March 27, 2024, Xi reminded his guests, “China has overcome numerous difficulties and challenges to reach where it is today. It did not collapse due to the ‘China Collapse Theory’ in the past, and it will not peak due to the ‘China Peak Theory’ now. We will continue to advance high-quality development and Chinese-style modernization. … China’s development prospects are bright.”[39] 

This survey of recent statements and decisions by China’s leaders highlights a few key takeaways. First, China’s leaders evaluate their strategic environment on a relative basis. Although there is little doubt that China faces significant and mounting internal and external challenges, as previously discussed, China’s leaders nevertheless see certain trends working in their favor. They believe America is in decline and that America’s diminishing capacity to control outcomes beyond its borders is opening space for China to have a greater voice on the world stage. They believe Chinese-led international initiatives are gaining momentum and acceptance, notably in the developing world. They appear to underweight traditional measures of their own economic performance, such as GDP growth, in favor of new concepts that aim to take a more holistic approach to development. And above all, Xi seems focused on stoking national pride and extolling confidence in China’s course. Fair-minded observers can reach different conclusions on whether such confidence is warranted by observable facts. That is a separate conversation, though. What is clear is that China’s leaders explicitly reject the framing of “peak China,” and they believe they can continue to achieve progress toward their national goals by persisting in their current course. 

“Peak China” is a Broken Compass for American Policymakers

There are several risks for American policymakers to organize policy based on assumptions of China as a peaking power. The first risk is that such a mental model could skew forecasts of future Chinese behavior. American policymakers could be on heightened alert to risks of China mobilizing military forces to seize territory or take aggressive moves that resemble the behavior of past peaking powers, such as Imperial Germany before World War I and the Japanese Empire during World War II. This could result in analysts and policymakers misreading signals from Beijing, including by presuming that virtually every Chinese action represents a prelude to war that must be met with metal-on-metal military counterforce.

Such thinking has already seeped into public commentary in Washington on Taiwan. It has contributed to active and retired flag-rank military officers waging a public bidding war to predict the precise timeline of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, with estimates spanning 2023, 2025, 2027, and beyond. It has caused prominent policy analysts to warn that China’s stockpiling of critical economic inputs represents a clear preparation for war with the United States over Taiwan.[40] 

To be clear, China’s decision-making around military operations against Taiwan is opaque. There is a real risk that Beijing could employ force against Taiwan. China is investing massive sums to develop military capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. Beijing also has been exercising its military and paramilitary forces in more aggressive ways around Taiwan, a trend that has accelerated since then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan.[41]

At the same time, amidst rising anxiety in Washington over Taiwan, a few important details have become lost. First, there has been notable consistency for over 20 years in terms of how Taiwan has been treated in China’s top planning documents—the Political Report to the National People’s Congress and the State Council Work Report. Second, Xi’s rhetoric on Taiwan has been largely consistent. Even Xi’s most noteworthy statement linking Taiwan unification with national rejuvenation repeats pronouncements that Xi’s two predecessors also made.[42] Beijing has pursued stockpiling consistently and publicly for many years and for reasons that extend beyond Taiwan scenarios. They are part of Xi’s broader goal of building national reserves and an emergency preparedness capacity in food, energy, and resources, as well as supply chain security—a “fortress economy” calculated to withstand coercion and immunize against pressures from countries that oppose China’s rise.[43] 

The risk of funneling analysis of Chinese behavior through a narrow “peak China” lens is that doing so incentivizes analysis that confirms assumptions about China’s preparations to use military force to achieve national objectives. This generates pressures for militarized American responses to Chinese actions, thus contributing to an escalatory action-reaction dynamic.

Notwithstanding their public projections of confidence in China’s national course, if China’s leaders feel internally insecure about their current standing, there is a risk that Beijing could  potentially lash out against perceived slights to project strength and prevent other countries from taking advantage of its vulnerability.[44] As M. Taylor Fravel illuminates in his body of research on the topic, Chinese leaders rarely, if ever, launch wars of diversion to distract from domestic challenges, but Chinese leaders have shown a pattern of becoming more aggressive in responding to perceived external challenges at times of domestic turmoil, such as in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war during the Great Leap Forward.   

Fravel warns that if China’s domestic challenges worsen, “its leaders will probably become more sensitive to perceived external challenges, especially on issues such as Taiwan. Increased pressure on China could easily backfire and motivate Beijing to become more aggressive to demonstrate its resolve to other states despite its internal difficulties.”[45] 

Taiwan presents a constant challenge to American policymakers. Any failure by the United States to demonstrate resolve in pushing back against Chinese pressure on Taiwan could send a signal of permissiveness, thereby eroding the will of Taiwan people to resist and inviting China to become more aggressive in coercing Taiwan to bend to its will. On the flip side, any American effort that Beijing interprets as exploiting China’s own limitations or vulnerabilities could invite Chinese overreaction, thereby precipitating the very type of scenario that American strategy is designed to prevent. There is no simple solution for upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Striking an effective policy balance requires continuous focus and constant calibration by senior officials in Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. Efforts to sustain this balance are made more difficult if the intention of every Chinese action is predetermined to conform with the blunt logic of “peak China” theory.

There also is a risk that using “peak China” theory to guide policy could induce a sense of urgency to push back publicly and aggressively against Chinese initiatives. Rhetorical emphasis on China as an enemy creates several challenges for U.S. policy. First, it reinforces a public perception among the Chinese public that their country is under attack from a hostile foreign power. This very well could cause Chinese citizens to rally behind their leaders rather than to question the soundness of their leaders’ decisions. Such a rallying effect could embolden Chinese leaders to become more confrontational with the United States, rather than less so. Second, from the U.S. perspective it is better for China’s leaders to underperform while remaining overconfident. If American experts judge that Beijing’s present policy decisions are working against the country’s long-term objectives, then it would make sense not to interrupt those decisions.

Another risk for American policymakers in adopting “peak China” thinking to guide their decision-making is that doing so could induce overreaction to current challenges and underweight preparation for the long-term nature of U.S.-China competition. In other words, it could create an expectation that Washington will only need to concentrate its focus and its forces to deter Beijing from lashing out during the coming period when China is peaking in national power, and once that period has passed, America will comfortably sustain its lead in overall national power. This could cause American policymakers to fixate on countering every Chinese action and initiative in the near term, thus becoming reactive to China rather than seizing the initiative to rebuild America’s sources of national advantage.

Like it or not, China is not going anywhere. The country is unlikely to collapse or to retreat behind its borders and accept a subordinate role in the international system. Even with its tremendous internal and external challenges, China still has room to grow its economy and to improve its national conditions.

Given these realities, American leaders would be wise to prepare for an intense, long-term contest with China for global leadership. There likely will not be any decisive military battles or watershed moments when one side triumphs and the other falls. Gains and setbacks will be relative. The outcome of this contest will turn on national performance. America will best be able to grow its economy, expand its innovation edge, and strengthen the power of its example by investing more in its sources of strength and influence rather than fixating on countering China. America’s unique advantages are its domestic dynamism, its global alliance network, and its unique convening power to galvanize collective action on global challenges. That is where the United States must focus its resources and attention going forward, upping its own game, even as it is protecting against harm from China and others that seek to dislodge America from its global leadership position.

About the Contributor

Ryan Hass is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, where he is the Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He also is a nonresident affiliated fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School. Prior to joining Brookings, Hass served as director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) from 2013 to 2017. In that role, he advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and coordinated among U.S. government departments and agencies implementation of U.S. policy toward the region. Prior to the White House, Hass was a Foreign Service Officer serving overseas in Beijing, Seoul, and Ulaanbaatar, and domestically in the State Department Offices of Taiwan Coordination and Korean Affairs. He is the author of Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence (Yale University Press, 2021) and The future of US policy toward China: Recommendations for the Biden administration (Brookings, 2020).

Notes

[1] Liu Ligang, “Property Sector Critical to Growth,” China Daily, January 29, 2024, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202401/29/WS65b6ff1ba3105f21a507ec78.html.

[2] Ryan Hass, “How Will Biden and Trump Tackle Trade with China?” Brookings, April 4, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-will-biden-and-trump-tackle-trade-with-china/.

[3] Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “The End of China's Rise," Foreign Affairs, October 1, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20240715.

[4] “How Severe are China’s Demographic Challenges?” China Power, March 6, 2023, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-demographics-challenges/.

[5] Briana Boland, Kevin Dong, Jude Blanchette, Ryan Hass, and Erica Ye, “How China’s Human Capital Impacts Its National Competitiveness,” CSIS, June 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-chinas-human-capital-impacts-its-national-competitiveness.

[6] Martin Chorzempa, “China’s Updated Playbook for Reviving Growth Risks More Tensions with the World," Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 25, 2024, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/chinas-updated-playbook-reviving-growth-risks-more-tensions-world.

[7] Cheng Siwei et al., In Depth: Why China’s Efforts to Resolve Hidden Government Debt Could Fall Short,” Caixin Global, March 13, 2024, www.caixinglobal.com/2024-03-13/in-depth-why-chinas-efforts-to-resolve-hidden-government-debt-could-fall-short-102175019.html.

[8] "Xi Focus: Xi Stresses PLA's Political Loyalty at Crucial Meeting Held in Old Revolutionary Base," Xinhua,  June 19, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240619/f978a22b64bb450bbde978d3869c2425/c.html.

[9] Laurie Chen, “China’s Xi Says Army Faces ‘Deep-Seated’ Problems in Anti-Corruption Drive,” Reuters, June 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-army-faces-deep-seated-problems-anti-corruption-drive-2024-06-19/.

[10] Simina Mistreanu, “China’s Embattled Former Foreign Minister Steps Down as Member of the Legislature,” AP News, February 27, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/qin-gang-resigns-legislature-foreign-minister-china-fd15a275387c28e711727eb1bfc4b66f.

[11] The White House, “Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,” August 9, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/08/09/executive-order-on-addressing-united-states-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in-countries-of-concern/.

[12] “Remarks by Under Secretary for International Affairs Jay Shambaugh on Chinese Overcapacity and the Global Economy.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 10, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2455; Karen Gilchrist, “EU’s von Der Leyen Echoes Yellen’s Calls for Tough Stance on Chinese Overcapacity,” CNBC, April 9, 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/04/09/eus-von-der-leyen-echoes-yellens-calls-for-tough-stance-on-chinese-overcapacity.html; Jeff Pao, “Indonesia Rebuffs China’s Global South Trade Drive,” Asia Times, July 3, 2024, http://asiatimes.com/2024/07/indonesia-rebuffs-chinas-global-south-trade-drive/; Mariana Durao and Martha Viotti Beck, “Brazil Joins Protectionist Wave in Face of Cheap Steel Imports,” Bloomberg.com, April 23, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-23/brazil-joins-protectionist-wave-in-face-of-cheap-steel-imports.

[13] Stephen M. Walt, "Stop Worrying about Chinese Hegemony in Asia," Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/stop-worrying-about-chinese-hegemony-in-asia/.

[14] Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “The End of China's Rise,” Foreign Affairs, October 1, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20240715.

[15] 习近平 (Xi Jinping), “关于坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的几个问题” (Several Questions about Upholding and Developing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics), 求是 (Seeking Truth), April 1, 2019, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-04/01/c_1124307480.htm.  

[16] Xi Jinping, “Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at Meeting Marking 1911 Revolution,” China Daily, October 9, 2021, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202110/13/WS6166e9afa310cdd39bc6ebcd.html. 

[17] 习近平 (Xi Jinping), “习近平: 努力开创中国特色大国外交新局面” (Xi Jinping: Strive to Create a New Phase in Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics), Xinhua, June 23, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-06/23/c_1123025806.htm.

[18] Xi Jinping, “Improve Prevention and Control Capabilities, Focus on Preventing and Resolving Major Risks, and Maintain Sustainable and Healthy Economic Development and Overall Social Stability,” Interpret: China, CSIS, January 21, 2019, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/improve-prevention-and-control-capabilities-focus-on-preventing-and-resolving-major-risks-and-maintain-sustainable-and-healthy-economic-development-and-overall-social-stability/.

[19] 习近平 (Xi Jinping), “受权发布丨习近平：关于《中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革、推进中国式现代化的决定》的说明” (Authorized to Release: Xi Jinping: A Note Regarding “The Decision of the CCP Regarding Further Deepening Reforms and Promoting Chinese-style Modernization), Xinhua, July 21, 2024, http://www.news.cn/20240721/f2b52433c9c34604889c02799a2b1aa8/c.html.

[20] Boyi Nan, “专访｜朱威烈谈《北京宣言》：全球南方的力量开始显现” (Exclusive Interview: Zhu Weilie Discusses the “Beijing Declaration”: The Power of the Global South is Beginning to Emerge), The Paper, July 23, 2024, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28165115.

[21] Beijing, May 12–13, 2024.

[22] Yu Jie, "China ‘Under Siege,’" Chatham House, July 24, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024-07-24-china-under-siege-yu.pdf.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Teddy Ng, “China’s ‘Two Sessions’ 2023: Xi Jinping Directly Accuses US of Leading Western Suppression of China,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3212627/chinas-two-sessions-2023-xi-jinping-directly-accuses-us-leading-western-suppression-china.

[25] Ryan Neelam and Jack Sato, “Global Diplomacy Index—2024 Key Findings Report,” Lowy Institute (Sydney), February 2024, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/GDI_Key_Findings.pdf.

[26] Jie Gao and Kenneth W. Allen, “Re-Engaging with the World: China’s Military Diplomacy in 2023,” China Maritime Report No. 37, China Maritime Studies Institute (Newport, RI), April 15, 2024, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.

[27] Ryan Hass, Bruce Jones, Emma Salisbury, and Thomas Shugart, “How Strong is China’s Navy,” Brookings, July 26, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/events/how-strong-is-chinas-navy/.

[28] “Exports-Partners,” CIA’s World Factbook,  https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/exports-partners/.

[29] Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Isaac Kardon, “Playing Both Sides of the U.S.-Chinese Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs, March 15, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/playing-both-sides-us-chinese-rivalry.

[30] For example, the readout by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation notes that as of October 2022, more than 100 countries and international organizations had expressed their support for the Global Development Initiative: https://unsouthsouth.org/2023/09/28/chinas-global-development-initiative-emphasizes-inclusive-growth/.

[31] Wang Yi, “从和平共处到命运与共的历史跨越” (The Historical Leap from Peaceful Coexistence to a Shared Destiny), 求是 (Seeking Truth), no. 14, July 16, 2024,  http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-07/16/c_1130179381.htm.

[32] “India, China Foreign Ministers Agree to Work on Border Issues,” Reuters, July 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-china-foreign-ministers-agree-step-up-talks-border-issues-2024-07-04/. 

[33] “Wang Yi on China-Europe Relations: Hopes for a Green Light All the Way,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, March 7, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202403/t20240307_11254912.shtml. 

[34] Party Group of the National Bureau of Statistics, “我国经济回升向好、长期向好的基本趋势没有改变”  (China's Economic Recovery and Long-term Positive Trend Remain Unchanged), 求是 (Seeking Truth), no. 3, February 1, 2024, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-02/01/c_1130069323.htm.

[35] “中央经济工作会议后首次国内考察, 总书记这样强调 ‘高质量发展’” (After the Central Economic Work Conference, the General Secretary Emphasizes ‘High-Quality Development’ during His First Domestic Inspection), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), December  21, 2023,  http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/1221/c1001-40143993.html.

[36] Arthur Kroeber, “Unleashing ‘new quality productive forces’: China’s strategy for technology-led growth,” Brookings, June 4, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unleashing-new-quality-productive-forces-chinas-strategy-for-technology-led-growth/ 

[37] Gao and Allen, “Re-Engaging with the World.”

[38] 习近平 (Xi Jinping). “Speech at the Meeting on Cultural Inheritance and Development.” 求是 (Seeking Truth), November 14, 2023, http://en.qstheory.cn/2023-11/14/c_937963.htm.

[39] “习近平会见美国工商界和战略学术界代表” (Xi Jinping Meets with Representatives from the American Business and Strategic Academic Communities), Embassy of the PRC in the USA, March 27, 2024, http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/zmgx_1/zxxx/202403/t20240327_11271873.htm.

[40] Elbridge Colby (@ElbridgeColby), “There’s Really Little Question About It. We Don’t Know Whether They’ll Pull the Trigger, But China Is Very Clearly Preparing for a Major War with the United States,” X, July 24, 2024,  https://x.com/ElbridgeColby/status/1816234510322917814.

[41] Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, and Matthew Slade, “Tracking China’s April 2023 Military Exercises around Taiwan,” China Power, November 8, 2023, https://chinapower.csis.org/tracking-chinas-april-2023-military-exercises-around-taiwan/.

[42] Yu Jie, "China ‘Under Siege.’".

[43] Jimmy Goodrich, “China’s Evolving Fortress Economy,” UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, July 2024, https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024_wp5_goodrich_v1-FINAL-2.pdf.

[44] M. Taylor Fravel, "The Myth of Chinese Diversionary War," Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/myth-chinese-diversionary-war.

[45] Ibid.

Photo credit: Sgt. Mikki Sprenkle, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons