Do Chinese Leaders and Elites Think Their Best Days Are Behind Them?
Despite its current economic slump, official statements by senior Chinese leaders indicate that they remain optimistic about the country’s economic future. They have responded critically to the “peak China” thesis, providing a lengthy list of favorable factors in support of their optimistic assessment of China’s future trajectory, such as the country’s advantages of scale, accumulated economic resources and technological capabilities, and its new development framework crafted to mitigate the effects of U.S.-led containment. Although Chinese leaders’ optimism is partly grounded in reality, it may be premature because the country’s immense potential will unlikely be realized without effective implementation of the necessary reforms. Examination of statements by senior Chinese leaders does not provide useful clues as to whether or when Chinese power will peak. However, it does show that Chinese leaders do not believe that their best days are behind them.
As the Chinese economy remains stuck in the doldrums, the country’s economic prospects for the coming decades have become one of the hottest topics of debate and speculation. Not too long ago, China appeared to be poised to surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in dollar terms (it is already the largest economy when measured in purchasing power parity, or PPP). But such a scenario seems much less likely today. Due to a combination of factors, such as America’s strong economic performance after the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s anemic growth since 2022, and the depreciation of Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar, the gap between the two economies in dollar terms has actually grown, not shrunk, during the last two years. In 2021, China’s GDP was 75 percent that of the U.S. in dollar terms, but by the end of 2023, Chinese GDP, at $17.7 trillion, was 65 percent of U.S. GDP.[1] Even though we should not make judgments about China’s long-term economic performance and strengths relative to those of the U.S. on the basis of a small number of datapoints, whether China has “peaked” is a question of profound strategic relevance. At the most basic level, estimations of the maximum extent of growth in Chinese power can influence the strategic calculations of the country’s leaders as well as those of its adversaries.
For example, a China unable to close the economic and technological gap with the U.S. because of its lower economic growth in the coming decades will likely pose a less dangerous long-term threat to American primacy. In terms of policy, this assessment may lend support to a more risk-averse and patient U.S. strategy of containment because the long-term term trends will tend to favor the U.S. But the same assessment may also lead to entirely different conclusions. As some analysts argue, a peaking China is more likely to start a war because it will have poorer odds of success the longer it waits.[2] Yet, other prominent scholars have warned against reaching the premature, if not erroneous, conclusion that China has “peaked” as such thinking could breed complacency or discount Chinese strategic patience.[3]
Despite the amount of attention it has received, the concept of “peak China” is not precisely defined. Does the phrase imply the end of a period of high growth? Does the term also mean that China will no longer close the gap with the U.S. in terms of economic output and technological capabilities? What about the timeframe of a “peaking China”? Are we talking about the recent past, today, or the coming years? To be sure, it may be impossible to answer with any reasonable degree of confidence whether China has already “peaked” or whether it is “peaking” since this intellectual exercise involves developments that have yet to occur and hence are unknowable.
Nevertheless, given the amount of attention this issue has received, it is both useful and necessary to examine it on the basis of the best information available. One promising approach is to analyze what Chinese elites, in particular the top leaders, think about their country’s future prospects. Their upbeat assessments may reflect a more positive outlook for the future and greater confidence in competing against the U.S. in the coming decades. Obviously, Chinese optimism would weaken the argument that China faces a closing window of strategic opportunity.
This essay first describes the responses by Chinese leaders, opinion-makers, and academics to what they call the “China peak theory.” It then examines speeches by senior officials about China’s economic prospects in the face of the challenging environment. It ends with an analysis of the gap or disconnect between a relatively optimistic assessment of China’s long-term fundamentals and the policies necessary to realize the country’s potential.
Critical Reception
Although discussion of “peak China” first appeared in Western media in late 2021 and attracted growing attention, its reception by Chinese officials and researchers was at best muted.[4] A keyword search for “theory of peak China” (中国见顶论) on CNKI yields no results for 2021 or 2022. Judging by the initial appearance of articles critical of the “theory of peak China” in official publications, this topic was not treated seriously in China until May 2023 when The Economist featured a cover story provocatively titled “Peak China?”[5] Yet, only a small number of articles were published in mostly second-tier official outlets to rebut the “peak China” thesis in 2023, as shown by the results of a Google search.[6] An official campaign denouncing the “theory of peak China” was launched in March 2024, shortly before Xi Jinping personally criticized it at a meeting with prominent American businessmen on March 27, 2024. Apparently trying to talk up the Chinese economy, Xi said, “The Chinese economy is healthy and sustainable…. [it] did not collapse because of the “theory of the collapse of China,” and [it] will not peak because of the “theory of peak China. We will continue to push for high-quality development…. China’s prospects for development are bright, and we have strong confidence.”[7]
Even before Xi’s public comment, the party’s propaganda machine had initiated a campaign to rebut the “theory of peak China,” probably suggesting that a top-level decision on denouncing this thesis had already been made. A quick review of a selection of articles published in 2024 on this issue reveals three main lines of attack adopted by Chinese propagandists and analysts. First, they denigrate “peak China” as just another Western conspiracy to contain and suppress China. The “ulterior motives” of proponents of “peak China,” according to a researcher at a government think-tank, consisted of “talking down” the Chinese economy, “defending the hegemonic status of the U.S.,” “crafting a narrative of China’s failure in order to conceal a lack of confidence in the West’s own development,” “undermining confidence in the Chinese economy,” “driving capital out of China,” and “shorting China to make a profit on international financial markets.”[8]
The second line of attack focuses on rebutting the specific factors cited by proponents of “peak China,” such as deteriorating demographics and decoupling from the West. A representative example is a commentary in Economic Daily published a week before Xi’s March statement. It emphasizes the rising quality of China’s labor force as a factor offsetting the effects of aging and the declining birthrates. China’s past and recent advances in science and technology are also referenced as evidence that the U.S.-led tech cold war will not succeed in blocking China from achieving future progress.[9] An additional point raised by critics of “peak China” is that, as a middle-income developing country, China is fundamentally different from the high-income countries such as Japan and Korea that have already “peaked” in economic growth. Specifically, they argue that the Chinese economy has greater room for growth due to its untapped potential and the lessons its policy makers have learned from Japan’s stagnation and failure to adjust to America’s “strategic suppression.” To bolster their argument, these critics assert that the government’s proposed reforms, in particular promotion of “high quality productive forces,” will sustain growth at a reasonably high level in the coming decades.[10]
The third, and last line of attack questions the use of the nominal exchange rate to measure the size of the Chinese economy. Due to its higher inflation rate and appreciation of the U.S. dollar, according to this critique, the size of the U.S. economy is artificially exaggerated when measured in terms of the nominal exchange rate. At the same time, the lower inflation rate and the depreciation of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar have led to a corresponding under-estimation of the size of the Chinese economy. By implication, China is continuing to catch up with the U.S. if a more accurate measurement of the two economies is used.[11]
The optimism expressed by Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist at the World Bank and a member of the Standing Committee of the China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), is the most representative. In an interview with an official publication in March 2024, Lin projects that the Chinese economy could sustain an average annual growth rate of above 5 percent through 2035 due to a long list of favorable structural factors, such as its huge labor force pool, large number of entrepreneurs, vast domestic market with unrivaled economies of scale, and its advantages of economic backwardness (which allow the country to absorb the technologies of frontier economies with little or no cost).[12]
Sources of Optimism
Speeches and articles by senior leaders, including Xi Jinping, reflect both a recognition of the challenges and a relatively high level of confidence in meeting these challenges in the future. Ironically, the challenges listed by these leaders are similar to those cited by proponents of “peak China.” In his political report to the party’s 20th National Congress in October 2022, Xi identifies rising sentiments of de-globalization, unilateralism, protectionism as well as more frequent international conflicts, the likelihood of escalation of “external suppression and containment,” and unavoidable deep-seated “contradictions” in China’s reform and development.[13] Han Wenxiu, executive deputy director of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission has argued that China’s external environment has grown “increasingly severe and complicated” due to the West’s “suppression and containment.”[14] To be sure, senior Chinese leaders, including Xi himself, are also aware of the unfavorable domestic factors that could slow down the economy, such as insufficient aggregate demand, rising labor costs, slowing urbanization, environmental constraints, high inequality, inadequate food security, weak capacity for scientific and technological innovation relative to that in the advanced economies, and highly vulnerable supply chains due to a reliance on core Western technologies.[15]
On balance, as pointed out by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in early 2024, the “favorable factors for development that China faces outweigh the unfavorable ones,” and the fundamental long-term trends in the Chinese economy “remain positive.”[16]
1. Healthy fundamentals
The most favorable factor repeatedly invoked by Chinese leaders is the “scale advantage of a super-sized economy(超大规模经济体优势). In a November 2020 article published in People’s Daily on the new economic framework of “dual circulation,” then vice premier Liu He explains that as a middle-income economy with 1.4 billion people (more than 400 million of whom have a middle-level income), China’s domestic market will continue to expand, thus supplying needed demand. On the supply side, China’s high savings rate can finance investments; it has the world’s largest and most complete industrial systems and the ability to fill the gaps in its manufacturing sector; it also has more than 130 million economic firms and 170 million workers with a college-level education or specialized skills.[17] The NDRC reiterated these favorable structural factors in a publication in early 2024.[18]
In economic terms, such assessments contain valid points, at least at face value. China’s colossal scale provides the country with an enduring advantage in terms of supply and demand. Despite its status as an upper middle-income country, the amount of its final consumption – $9.5 trillion in 2022 – is big enough to satisfy the domestic demand needed to sustain growth.[19] Its vast supply chains make the country less reliant on external sources (with the exception of certain hi-tech goods such as semiconductors) and it will be able to promote innovation and maintain cost competitiveness. The size of Chinese imports – $2.7 trillion in 2022 – ensures the country’s critical position in the global trading system.[20]
2. Adequate resources and growing capabilities
Speeches and publications by senior leaders display a high level of confidence in meeting the problems of population aging, “decoupling,” and other difficult economic challenges in the coming decade. One favorable factor repeatedly referenced is the accumulation of human and material resources in the post-Mao period that has significantly improved the country’s competitiveness. These resources include a modern infrastructure, such as the world’s largest high-speed railway networks, modern highways, and 5G telecom networks. More than four decades of reform and integration with the global economy have enabled China to acquire manufacturing capabilities that account for 30 percent of the world’s manufacturing value-added.[21]
Although the country’s labor force is less skilled than those in the developed countries (skilled workers constitute only 27 percent of the labor force, according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security), the level of human capital has risen dramatically compared with that a decade ago. The average number of years of schooling among workers increased from 9.9 to 11.05 between 2012 and 2023. New workers joining the labor force have, on average, 14 years of education. The number of “highly skilled” workers now exceeds 60 million. Even population aging is a manageable problem. Chinese policy makers argue that China will not encounter labor shortages in the short term. The country has 860 million prime-age workers (ages 16–59) today. By 2035, this number will fall to 800 million. Because China will continue to invest in education, the quality of its human capital will increase, thus making its smaller labor pool more productive.[22] The real challenge, according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, is not the lack of workers but the persistent pressures on the government to create jobs.[23] (However, with the exception of a retired former finance minister who has warned about the mounting pension obligations, few senior leaders mention this challenge.)[24]
The West’s strategy of “decoupling” from China poses a serious risk to the country’s export-oriented manufacturing sector. But according to Wang Wentao, minister of Commerce, China will be able to preserve its linkages with global markets due to its enormous competitive advantages. In his view, China’s future economic success will critically depend on its continuing participation in the global economy despite the newly proposed “dual circulation” framework. In an article published in early 2022 in Qiushi, Wang argues that China will maintain its central role in the global trading system due to its huge demand for imports (estimated at $22 trillion in the coming decade), cost-competitive supply chains in most industries, accelerated progress in producing technology-intensive components in electronics, electrical equipment, and machine tools, and current lead in high-speed railway development and clean energy products.[25]
While recognizing the challenge of the U.S.-led tech cold war, Chinese officials nevertheless project optimistic forecasts that their country will gain greater scientific and technological capabilities because of its growing investments, large pool of talent, proven record of success, and large domestic market for testing, applying, and popularizing new technologies. The favorite pieces of evidence they like to cite includes the world’s largest number of scientists and engineers, the world’s second largest R&D budget (3.3 trillion yuan, or $460 billion, in 2023), and recent breakthroughs in quantum information technology, biotech, crewed space flights, lunar and Martian exploration, satellite navigation, and super-computing.[26]
3. Promising plans
The last source of optimism seems to be a high level of confidence in the plans to reorient China’s development strategy toward greater security and self-reliance in response to the adverse external environment. According to Xi, such plans will enable China to accelerate construction of a “new framework of development and to seize the initiative for economic development in the future” (加快构建新发展格局,把握未来发展主动权). In a speech to the Politburo in January 2023, Xi not only took credit for proposing the new framework of “dual circulation” in April 2020 but also claimed that experience since 2020 validates the feasibility of this new framework. The most important reason for the promise of this framework is that, as a “super-scale economy” (超大规模经济体), China can and must “circulate domestically” (可以也必须内部可循环). Acceleration of the construction of the “dual circulation” framework, according to Xi, will strengthen the foundations of China’s economic development and China’s survivability, competitiveness, and sustainability in dealing with “foreseeable and unforeseeable” dangerous storms.[27]
Xi did not downplay the challenges of making “dual circulation” a reality. But he appeared confident in the promise of this new framework, which consists of the following five pillars.
(1) Expanding domestic demand and deepening “supply side” reforms to strengthen the dynamism and reliability of “great domestic circulation.”
(2) Speeding up steps toward scientific and technological self-reliance to overcome external choke points.
(3) Accelerating the construction of a modern “industry production system.” (现代化产业体系).
(4) Promoting coordinated urban-rural and regional development to create a bigger and more integrated domestic consumer market.
(5) Deepening reform and opening to improve China’s competitiveness in the global economy.
Xi is not the only senior official expressing strong optimism about China’s economic prospects. An article authored by the NDRC shortly after publication of Xi’s Politburo speech provides evidence showing that the new framework of “dual circulation” has already demonstrated initial success.[28]
Optimism Justified?
The official assessment of China’s economic prospects, as briefly summarized above, shows that top Chinese leaders not only reject the notion that China has “peaked” but they also project a high degree of optimism about their ability to meet the difficult challenges ahead. Obviously, such optimism should be expected. It is difficult to imagine that Xi and other officials would agree with the “peak China” thesis because doing so would be a tacit acknowledgment of the administration’s failure and would imply the difficulties in realizing Xi’s “China Dream.” Nevertheless, their speeches and writings on China’s future also reflect both a degree of realism and several blind spots, or flawed understandings of their country’s future economic challenges.
As we note earlier, the optimism expressed by Chinese leaders is simultaneously colored by frank admissions of serious problems that could derail future economic development. In his speech to the CCP Central Committee’s 3rd plenum in July, Xi offered a lengthy list of deeply embedded – and well-known -- structural flaws in the economy that could jeopardize his new economic framework of “dual circulation” and tech self-sufficiency, such as unbalanced development, underdeveloped markets, insufficient innovative capacity, continuing dependency on core technologies under the control of other countries, an agrarian sector with a weak foundation, large regional and urban-rural disparities in income, and inadequate social and ecological protection.[29]
At the same time, many of the positive factors cited by Chinese officials are real. The scale advantage of China, for instance, is difficult to deny. The size of its domestic market, which is likely to continue to expand in the coming years, will generate the demand needed to sustain growth at a level probably higher than that implied by the “peak China” thesis. As a middle-income economy with a per capita income measured in PPP slightly more than one-quarter of that of the U.S., China’s potential for growth is substantial, as Martin Wolf and Nicholas Lardy have persuasively argued in recent writings.[30] The country’s private entrepreneurs have a proven record of taking enormous risks, moving up the learning curve, and building successful companies, some of which are world-class.
China’s impressively rapid gains in science and technology in recent years are likely to continue due to the party’s enormous investments in technological self-sufficiency, the huge pool of talent in the country, the resourcefulness of the country’s entrepreneurs, and the leakiness of Western sanctions. To be sure, the tightening of export controls by the U.S. and its allies will most probably slow down China’s progress in developing cutting-edge technologies in sectors such as semi-conductors, AI, and high-end manufacturing. But recent press reports of the revival of Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant heavily sanctioned by the U.S., suggest that the capacity for adaptation by Chinese firms should not be underestimated.[31]
Ironically, some of the flaws in the Chinese system that are blamed for its chronic economic inefficiencies might be new sources of efficiency gains in the coming years if the regime manages to implement effective reforms. Topping the list would be restructuring the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a radical overhaul of the hukou system that will boost labor market efficiency, equality, and education of migrant workers, and modernizing public finance (which will enable local governments to provide more social spending and indirectly increase household income). Even deteriorating demographics may not depress future economic growth as much as is assumed by the “peak China” thesis. As the labor force becomes increasingly better educated and more skilled, it can become more productive. Chinese factories have also begun to use robots on a much wider scale than expected.[32] These two trends likely will soften the impact of a smaller workforce in the coming two decades.
The factors listed above may justify the optimism of China’s top leaders, but their speeches also reveal serious blind spots. Curiously, the overriding emphasis on the new framework for economic development is making China less vulnerable to Western pressures, but Chinese leaders have said little about the potential costs of securitization and how fortifying China against Western economic coercion will incur a significant loss of efficiency. As China’s rapid growth in the post-Mao era was made possible by the maximization of the country’s comparative advantage through integration into the West-led global economy, economic disengagement with the West, in particular the forced import substitution of the technology products the West no longer wants to sell to China, is bound to make the Chinese economy less efficient.
Another blind spot is the alienation of the domestic private sector from Xi’s government since 2013. His failure to implement reforms promised in 2013 has been compounded by a series of crackdowns on private firms and leading entrepreneurs. Despite the party’s recent reassurances that it will maintain its policy of encouraging and supporting the private sector, it has not done anything in reality that can restore its much-damaged credibility among private entrepreneurs. Judging by the continuing exodus of wealthy Chinese – expected to hit a record of 15,200 in 2024 – winning back the private sector seems a tall order for the Xi regime.[33] As the private sector contributes to the bulk of economic activities and job creation, China is unlikely to regain its past growth momentum if private entrepreneurs have lost confidence in the party under Xi’s leadership.
A third blind spot is the apparent downplaying of the challenge of demographic aging. Although China probably will be able to manage the decline of labor supply more effectively than expected due to a combination of approaches (raising the retirement age, improving the quality of labor, and adopting robots on a huge scale), the spiraling costs of pensions and healthcare, expenditures that are straining local public finance, receive little attention in official speeches.
The final blind spot is Chinese leaders’ unduly optimistic assumption that the plans to sustain growth will be effectively implemented. On paper, most of their plans may seem to be grounded in reality and to have the potential to keep China’s economic trajectory moving upward in the coming decades. But even the best plans mean nothing if they are not implemented. Many reforms needed to avoid hitting an economic ceiling must be implemented effectively for Xi’s new framework of economic development, whether called “dual circulation,” “new quality productive forces,” or “Chinese-style modernization,” to succeed. For instance, generating sufficient domestic demand, the key to “dual circulation,” critically depends on raising household income. For decades, the Chinese government has been trying to increase domestic demand, but with little success. Similarly, human capital improvements require reform of the hukou system so migrants and their children can gain access to publicly funded services. Cultivation of the “new quality productive forces” will unlikely raise overall economic efficiency if the notoriously inefficient state-owned enterprises remain unreformed. Judging by the record of unfulfilled promises under Xi’s rule since 2012, a strong dose of skepticism about the promise of future reform is warranted.
Conclusion
Analyses of statements by senior Chinese leaders, including Xi, indicate that they remain optimistic about China’s future economic prospects. Their optimism is grounded in a set of favorable structural conditions that may, indeed, help power the Chinese economy ahead at a reasonable rate of growth despite the challenges it faces. It is reasonable to conclude that Chinese leaders are not convinced that the country’s power has “peaked.” In all likelihood, they remain confident that China will continue to gain strength in the future and time is still on their side.
Despite the optimistic outlook of Chinese leaders, the question about “peak China” is not answerable because “peak” can mean different things for different people and, even more importantly, the future of the Chinese economy remains highly uncertain. Its growth prospects critically depend on whether China will be able to effectively implement the necessary policies to meet the challenges of demographic aging, rebalance the economy, improve productivity, and mitigate the effects of “decoupling” with the West. As measuring China’s “peak” can only be done in relative terms, such as comparing the size of its economy with that of the U.S. or calculating its share of the global economy, as Logan Wright tries to do in his essay in this issue of China Leadership Monitor, the growth of other economies is a crucial, but also uncertain, variable.
Perhaps a more valuable approach to exploring "peak China" may lie not in pinpointing whether Chinese power has peaked or when it might do so in the future. Instead, it might be raising an awareness that the country will remain a powerful actor in the international system regardless of how its economy performs in the coming decades. This elemental geopolitical reality should be the basis on which American policy rests.
About the Contributor
Minxin Pei, the editor of China Leadership Monitor, is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. He is also a non-resident senior fellow of the U.S. German Marshall Fund. His books include China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (2006), China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (2016), The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China (2024).
Acknowledgment: I want to thank Celine Wang for her valuable research assistance.
Notes
[1] The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN-US .
[2] Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022).
[3] Oriana Skylar Mastro and Derek Scissors, “China Hasn’t Reached the Peak of Its Power: Why Beijing Can Afford to Bide Its Time,” Foreign Affairs (August 22, 2022); Evan S. Medeiros, “The Delusion of Peak China: America Can’t Wish Away Its Toughest Challenger,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2024): 40–49.
[4] Maximilian Mayer and Emilian Kavalski, “Have We Reached Peak China?” Politico, October 21, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/have-we-reached-peak-china/; Stella Yifan Xie, “China’s Economy Won’t Overtake the U.S., Some Now Predict,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/will-chinas-economy-surpass-the-u-s-s-some-now-doubt-it-11662123945 .
[5] “Is Chinese Power About to Peak?” The Economist, May 13, 2023, https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-05-13 .
[6] 任重,丁雅栀, “英媒炒作 ‘中国经济见顶,’专家：不必放心上，做好自己事最重要,” Global Times, May 13, 2023， https://finance.sina.cn/2023-05-13/detail-imytqssy8519310.d.html?from=wap ; 张启迪, “’‘中国崛起见顶论”必将再度破产,”世界知识 (September 16, 2023): 62–64.
[7] 习近平会见美国工商界和战略学术界代表,” 新华社, March 27, 2024, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202403/content_6941869.htm .
[8] 张玉环, “中国崛起见顶论 ‘缘何兴起?’ 习近平外交思想研究中心,” April 7, 2024, http://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2024-04/07/content_117109187.shtml ; 章思远, “警惕 ‘中国经济见顶论’背后包藏的祸心,” 新华网, March 3, 2024, http://www.news.cn/world/20240303/ec31614dd1e948a38d862b0ea5e620ea/c.html .
[9] “‘驳’中国崛起顶峰论,”经济日报, March 20, 2024, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2024/0320/c40531-40199146.html .
[10] 伍山林, “从发展战略看中国经济光明前景,” 中国社会科学报, June 1, 2024, https://theory.gmw.cn/2024-06/01/content_37357388.htm .
[11] 徐秀军, “中国仍将是世界经济发展的重要引擎,” 光明日报, March 2, 2024,
http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2024-03/02/c_1130084904.htm .
[12] “专访全国政协常委林毅夫,” March 6, 2024, https://www.nse.pku.edu.cn/sylm/xwsd/534645.htm .
[13] 习近平, “新时代新征程中国共产党的使命任务,” http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-06/30/c_1130170872.htm .
[14] 韩文秀, “以深化改革促进高质量发展,” 求是, No. 12 (2024),
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-06/16/c_1130162921.htm .
[15] 习近平, “开创我国高质量发展新局面,” 求是, No. 12 (2024), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-06/15/c_1130162887.htm ; 习近平, “当前经济工作的几个重大问题,” 求是, No. 4 (2023), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2023-02/15/c_1129362874.htm ; 国家发展和改革委员会, “全力推动构建新发展格局取得新突破,”求是, No. 8 (2023), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2023-04/16/c_1129525518.htm.
[16] 中共国家发展和改革委员会党组, “深入学习贯彻中央经济工作会议精神,狠抓落实推动高质量发展,” https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/ztzl/NEW_srxxgcjjpjjsx/jjsxyjqk/tgyg/202402/t20240220_1364159.html .
[17] 刘鹤, “加快构建以国内大循环为主体、国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局,”人民日报, November 25, 2020, https://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2020-11/25/content_5563986.htm .
[18] 中共国家发展和改革委员会党组, “深入学习贯彻中央经济工作会议精神,狠抓落实推动高质量发展,” 求是, No. 1 (2024), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-01/01/c_1130048917.htm .
[19] China Statistical Yearbook 2023, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/ndsj/2023/indexch.htm .
[20] China Statistical Yearbook 2023, https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/ndsj/2023/indexch.htm .
[21] 中共国家发展和改革委员会党组, “深入学习贯彻中央经济工作会议精神,狠抓落实推动高质量发展,” 求是, No. 1 (2024), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-01/01/c_1130048917.htm .
[22] “专访全国政协常委林毅夫：快则一两年，慢则两三年，中国一定能跨过高收入国家门槛,” 红星新闻, March 6, 2024, https://www.nse.pku.edu.cn/sylm/xwsd/534645.htm .
[23] 中共人力资源和社会保障部党组, “坚持和发展新时代促进高质量充分就业的宝贵经验,” 求是, No. 13 (2024), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-07/01/c_1130170864.htm .
[24] “专访楼继伟：应对人口变局 钱从哪里来,” 财新周刊, No. 32 (2023),
https://weekly.caixin.com/2023-08-12/102092437.html .
[25] 王文涛 , “以高水平对外开放推动构建新发展格局,” 求是, No. 2 (2022),
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Photo credit: Huangdan2060, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
