Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China’s Ministry of State Security
In recent years, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has become more visible and more prominent, reflecting an apparent increase in political influence under Xi Jinping. The tasks that MSS carries out – counterintelligence, state security, and domestic and foreign surveillance – have a central place in Xi Jinping’s securitized approach to governance, both in terms of how the party leadership conceptualizes threats, and how, in practice, Xi has transformed the party-state to deal with them. This article examines the changing organization, legal authorities, and work of the Ministry of State Security during Xi Jinping’s tenure. It analyzes the priorities and activities of its current Minister, Chen Yixin, including development of a legal architecture for state security work; the use of anti-corruption and rectification-and-education campaigns to improve political discipline and loyalty within MSS; heightened scrutiny of foreign business actors within China; efforts to enhance public education around state security, including through the use of social media; and Chen’s interactions with foreign counterparts.
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is one of the most secretive agencies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), even by the standards of China’s internal security sector: it rarely appears in state media and little is known or written about its activities or personnel. In the past several years, however, the MSS, and its minister, Chen Yixin (陈一新), have experienced an elevated public profile.[1] This increase in the visibility and prominence of the MSS under Xi Jinping appears to reflect a corresponding increase in the Ministry’s political power and influence, both in China and globally.[2] According to intelligence historian Calder Walton, today “China and its spies are like the Soviet Union on steroids” and “make Soviet efforts during the Cold War look low-energy.”[3] Walton estimates, citing an anonymous official from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that the MSS employs 800,000 personnel (compared to ~480,000 employed by the KGB at its height), and argues that the MSS now operates worldwide at a scale and tempo not seen in decades.[4]
The responsibilities of the MSS cover state security and intelligence, including counter-intelligence, political security, some domestic surveillance, and foreign intelligence work (both human intelligence and cyber-operations).[5] These tasks have a central place in Xi Jinping’s threat perceptions, and they are equally central to his securitized approach to governance. His “comprehensive state security concept” (which is also often translated as “comprehensive national security concept”), promulgated in 2014, focuses on the ways in which internal and external security threats are interlinked, and it pays particular attention to the risks of internal destabilization due to foreign subversion and infiltration. These are the threats for which the MSS, as an organization, was created and remains uniquely positioned to address, counter, and guard against.[6] (For example, its domestic surveillance activities appear to focus particularly on the targeting of foreign nationals present in China and on people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao; the MSS also engages in the monitoring of domestic dissidents and religious-ethnic minorities, perhaps because Chinese leaders are convinced that such movements and activities are backed by external support.)[7]
The MSS, therefore, is a critical actor in the implementation of Xi Jinping’s security vision. Moreover, during Xi’s tenure, counter-espionage and a cluster of related “political security” tasks carried out by the MSS have become prominent features of Chinese governance and public rhetoric.[8] Thus, this China Leadership Monitor essay examines the Ministry’s evolution, priorities under the current minister, Chen Yixin, and some important aspects of its work.
The Ministry of State Security: Historical Origins and Organizational Evolution
The MSS, established in 1983 to conduct intelligence/counter-intelligence work, was created from a merger of the Counter-intelligence Department of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Central Investigation Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[9] One of the motivations behind the creation of the MSS as a separate entity was to address the heightened risks of foreign infiltration during China’s “reform and opening” period. Initially, the Ministry built up provincial bureaus largely via personnel reassigned from the MPS, while military organs dominated external intelligence; this led to uneven subnational growth of the MSS departments and bureaus at the provincial, municipal, and county levels.[10] Thus, although many external observers may be familiar with the MSS primarily for its formidable alleged cyber-activities (see below), it is important to understand that the MSS was domestically focused in its origins, and it has retained this focus throughout its history, distinguishing it from some other foreign intelligence services around the world.
For most of their history, local MSS entities typically reported vertically upward within the MSS hierarchy and horizontally to the local political-legal committee, the latter of which had discretion over staff numbers, organization, and the majority of the budget.[11] A limited set of reforms to the state security system in 2000, however, placed the municipal state security bureaus more directly under the provincial leaderships, a partial centralization that resolved some tensions between vertical and horizontal authority but that also led to the closure or downsizing of a number of local units while failing to fully resolve the problems created by the dual accountability structure.[12] This structure persisted until a second set of reforms in 2016–17, as described below.
Despite the Ministry’s importance to Xi’s concept of security and its lead role in addressing threats to the CCP’s political and regime security, early in Xi’s tenure the MSS was not necessarily viewed as an untarnished asset to accomplish such a mission. Xi came to power shortly after the authorities reportedly disrupted a significant network of American informants in China, including some inside within the MSS itself.[13] The Ministry was also rumored to have been heavily influenced by Zhou Yongkang, the powerful internal security czar whom Xi distrusted, purged, and prosecuted; the official who investigated Zhou, Chen Wenqing, subsequently became minister of State Security prior to Chen Yixin’s appointment. These issues made the MSS an early target of Xi’s purges within the political-legal apparatus and subsequently subject to the “rectification and education” campaigns directed at that same apparatus to ensure its political discipline and loyalty. (As discussed in more detail below, that campaign was directed by current minister of State Security, Chen Yixin, in his role prior to his becoming head of the MSS.)
Xi appears to have attempted to use purges, personnel shuffling, reorganizations, and rectification-and-education campaigns to remake the MSS into a powerful and prominent organization to serve as the point organization in his broad-based effort to strengthen China’s protections against espionage and foreign infiltration, which are, themselves, cornerstones of Xi’s multi-term project to remake the party-state into a system capable of achieving his goal of “comprehensive state security.” Officials with state security backgrounds have today ascended to senior roles in the party-state’s leadership. The China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), an MSS-affiliated think-tank, houses the country’s flagship research institute on Xi’s comprehensive state security concept, providing important insights into the way that Chinese scholars and leaders understand and pursue state/national security.[14]
The drive to enhance state security has a significant legal component that has been noted by outside observers, but it also is an aspect of the push for security emphasized by Ministry leaders themselves. Indeed, one of the first security laws passed under Xi Jinping was the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law, which was updated in 2023.[15] The Counter-Espionage Law, which expanded the definition of espionage and the range of potential targets, was implemented in tandem with the detention of employees working for several foreign firms as well as with the curtailment of access to data used in both business/market research and academic studies.[16] Several months after the revised Counter-Espionage Law went into effect, the State Council on July 1, 2023 proposed a revision to the PRC’s Law on Guarding State Secrets, which was then revised in late February 2024 and entered into force on May 1 of that year.[17]
These steps have been touted by PRC state security officials, including Chen Yixin, indicating alignment between Chen’s leadership and the legal reforms taking place in the area of Chinese security policy and law. In 2023, for example, the Central Party School’s Study Times published a commentary by Chen Yixin in which he exhorts officials to study the new Counter-Espionage Law and “enhance our capacity to shape state/national security with legal tools.”[18] More recently, Chen emphasized the “more than 20” specialized national security laws passed under Xi Jinping’s leadership, as well as an additional “more than 110 laws and regulations that contain national security clauses.” In the same commentary, Chen refers specifically to the Counter-Espionage Law as “a response to the needs of the anti-espionage struggle under the new situation.” [19]
The state security bureaucracy was reformed in 2016–17 and placed under “vertical leadership” (垂直领导), thus changing the structure of organizational accountability under which the Ministry operates. Analyst Edward Schwarck calls these centralizing reforms “the most important development in China’s civilian intelligence system” since the founding of the MSS in 1983.[20] The reforms appear to have shifted cadre authority – the ability to appoint and oversee local officials, which in turn can affect staffing, budgets, and local decision-making – from horizontal (the local party committee) to vertical (the party committee above that level within the MSS itself), which Schwarck describes as having “severed the commanding role that provincial governments had over their local state security bureaus.”[21]
These reforms may have led to an expanded remit for state security at subnational levels vis-à-vis other government agencies, but they also appear to have enabled greater scrutiny of the lower levels in the state security system by authorities at the top of the hierarchy. Deputy Minister Dong Jingwei noted this “vertical management” in a set of reported comments in 2021 about the Ministry’s dispatch of teams to strengthen supervision and guidance at the provincial, municipal, and county levels, as part of the rectification-and-education campaign overseen by Chen Yixin (prior to his appointment as minister).[22] A fall 2024 training session for subnational state security cadres, Minister Chen also mentioned the need to strengthen the concept of vertical management as one of eight leadership qualities required for MSS leaders.[23]
As noted previously, the focus on domestic counter-espionage and political security may be somewhat surprising to readers who are acquainted with the MSS primarily through reports of its cyber-espionage activities against American and other international targets.[24] The U.S Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Justice, and other U.S. government agencies have consistently – in advisories, sanctions announcements, and indictments – identified cyber-threat actors affiliated with the MSS as executing sophisticated cyber-attacks and online espionage operations,[25] and analysts assess that in the past several years, groups affiliated with the MSS have likely eclipsed groups affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the sophistication and breadth of their hacking operations.[26] For example, the MSS is believed to be connected to advanced persistent threats such as Salt Typhoon, which U.S. authorities announced in 2024 had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging cyber campaigns publicly reported.[27] A full examination of MSS-affiliated cyber-activities is beyond the scope of this essay (and difficult to ascertain with certainty, given the opacity of these activities even relative to other aspects of MSS work). It is important, however, to acknowledge the reported role of the MSS in cybersecurity threats abroad because such alleged operations contribute significantly to foreign perceptions of the Ministry’s growing, but still shadowy and opaque, power and influence, and the belief that its traditional internal focus is increasingly being supplemented by a growing global presence, role, and impact.
The MSS under Chen Yixin: Priorities and Significant Activities
Chen’s Background
The current Minister of State Security is Chen Yixin, a member of the CCP Central Committee.[28] Born in Zhejiang in September 1959, Chen obtained a degree in physics and joined the CCP in 1982. He worked as a senior aide to Xi Jinping during Xi’s time in Zhejiang (2002–7) and then became party secretary of Jinhua and Wenzhou (prefectural-level cities in Zhejiang) as well as a member of the provincial party standing committee.[29] From there, he moved to become deputy director of the General Office for Xi’s Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform (2015–16), and then became party secretary of Wuhan and deputy party secretary of Hubei (2017–18). In March 2018, he became secretary-general of the Central Political-Legal Commission (CPLC).[30] In early 2020, Chen was sent back to Wuhan to help oversee the party’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak.[31]
Chen has also played a significant role in Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts, including with respect to the MSS.[32] Under the 2018–20 saohei anti-corruption campaign, Chen headed the National Saohei Office (全国扫黑办, Quanguo saoheiban), while also serving as secretary-general of the CPLC.[33] In July 2020, Chen announced a new “education-and-rectification” (教育整顿, jiaoyu zhengdun) campaign within the political-legal apparatus prior to the 2022 party congress, and compared it to the party rectification in Yan’an.[34] This campaign is the context in which the “vertical management” of the state security system was mentioned by Deputy Minister of State Security Dong Jingwei, who noted the dispatch of teams to multiple subnational levels as part of the campaign’s efforts to strengthen supervision and guidance.[35]
Priorities as Minister of State Security
In July 2022, while he was serving as secretary-general of the CPLC, Chen – who would soon be appointed minister of State Security – identified creation of a safe, stable environment for the 20th Party Congress as “the top priority on the political-legal front.” At the same time, he called for “self-revolution” within the political-legal apparatus to ensure that the “knife handle” (a common euphemism for the internal security organs) never rusts and that the political-legal system remains “loyal, clean, and responsible.”[36] As minister, he continued to stress clean governance and political discipline within the coercive apparatus.[37]
Chen has been among the leading voices calling to advance implementation of the comprehensive state security concept. He has, for example, been among the leaders using variants of the “constructing a new security pattern” tifa, as previously analyzed in the China Leadership Monitor.[38] In May 2023, he referred to provincial state security heads as the “backbone” (骨干, gugan) of state security and called for accelerated “construction of a new work pattern for national/state security organs” (国家安全机关工作新格局), language that also appeared in his April commentary on China’s 2023 celebration of “National Security Education Day.”[39]
Chen’s April 2024 “National Security Education Day” commentary, which marked the tenth anniversary of Xi Jinping’s promulgation of the comprehensive state security concept, reminds readers that national security is the foundation of national rejuvenation (国家安全是民族复兴的根基). It repeats the emphasis on the primacy (首要位置) of regime security that lies at the heart of the comprehensive state security concept as well as the emphasis on the party’s “absolute leadership over state security work” (加强党对国家安全工作的绝对领导).[40] Each of these phrases had appeared in earlier remarks by Chen, and they have emerged as central components of the rhetoric surrounding state/national security. Chen’s 2024 commentary also calls for enhanced construction of reporting platforms, such as 12339.gov.cn (an online reporting platform for citizens to report suspected espionage[41]); continued work to improve coordination mechanisms for counter-espionage; the weaving of a “’multi-dimensional network’ of anti-espionage security prevention,” and construction of a “steel Great Wall to protect the security of national secrets.”[42] Several months later, in remarks at a training course for new MSS department/bureau heads, Chen emphasized the need to develop eight leadership qualities, including: political abilities; vertical management; strategic thinking; combat skills; scientific and technological literacy; the “driving force of reform”; the spirit and ability to struggle; and a disciplined work style.[43]
In 2023, Chen was tasked with overseeing China’s heightened scrutiny of foreign businesses, an effort that has been perceived externally as indicating a prioritization of security over economic growth. In some cases, social media messages from MSS have been interpreted by external observers as a key indicator of China’s willingness to tighten political control even if it comes at the cost of alienating foreign investors and overseas companies operating inside the PRC.[44] For example, during the China Development Forum, as Premier Li Qiang and other senior Chinese economic officials emphasized China’s openness to international economic exchange, the MSS put up a social media post warning of espionage risks posed by foreign consultancies[45] – a step that suggests either a lack of coordination among China’s economic and security bureaucracies or a willingness by the MSS to publicly counter-message against other official statements. In December, the Ministry posted two statements defending the Counter-Espionage Law and minimizing rebuttals to the argument that it damages the business environment and imposes economic costs. [46] Interestingly, these particular posts appeared in both English and Chinese – a first for the weixin account – suggesting, perhaps, that the MSS is becoming more conscious of its foreign audiences.
Public Education on State Security: Curriculum and “New Media”
Strengthening public education about state security has been another of Chen’s priorities. In May 2023, at the first known meeting of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) since the 20th Party Congress (and since Chen’s appointment as MSS head), Xi Jinping stressed the importance of public communications and education about state/national security; the CNSC meeting also approved a document on this topic.[47]
The most visible component of the party-state’s effort is a “National Security Education Day,” held on April 15 of every year since 2016 (the occasion on which Chen Yixin usually publishes a commentary in Qiushi).[48] But state security has also been embedded in China’s education system: in 2018 and 2020, the Ministry of Education issued an opinion and subsequent guidelines to strengthen state/national security education at the primary school, secondary school, and university levels, resulting in the development of a new curriculum and national security institutes across China.[49] In 2024, Chen referred to the need to enhance state security education as a “basic, long-term strategic project,”[50] suggesting that these efforts are likely to continue in the years ahead.
The other way in which the Ministry appears to be enhancing its efforts to provide and promote education on state security issues is through the use of social media; this is another data point in the overall prominence, visibility, and influence of the Ministry under Xi Jinping. While serving as secretary-general of the CPLC, Chen was known for advocating for the use of and for employing social media; he called for the innovative development of propaganda and public opinion work in a speech as early as 2018.[51] After he moved to the MSS, he appears to have encouraged the ministry to take a similar approach. On July 31, 2023, in conjunction with the revised Counter-Espionage Law entering into effect and in the aftermath of the late May CNSC meeting on public education around national security, the MSS launched a weixin account under the name 国家安全部 (Guojia anquanbu).[52] In late 2023, a post on the account referred to itself as “an important platform to promote Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the rule of law and the comprehensive national security concept, and to carry out national/state security education for all.”[53] Chen’s April 2024 “National Security Education Day” commentary in Qiushi also highlighted the account as an example of using new media to educate and safeguard national security.[54] The account reflects some degree of experimentation: on Chinese People’s Police Day in January 2024, the MSS launched a comic series that was described as based on real cases and aimed at engaging young people.[55]
The inaugural MSS weixin post, titled “Counter-intelligence and Counter-espionage Require Whole-of-Society Mobilization!” calls for a range of activities to enhance counter-espionage security publicity and education (反间谍安全防范宣传教育).[56] It opens with the statement, “National security is the foundation of national rejuvenation, and social stability is the prerequisite for national strength,” phrasing that has appeared in other remarks by Chen. The post then references the new Counter-Espionage Law, describing “the counter-intelligence struggle [as] severe and complex.” It refers to the need for both state security agencies and “extensive participation by the people,” who are to be “commended, rewarded, and protected,” for reporting espionage threats and other “acts that endanger national security” and who should “jointly build a multi-dimensional counter-intelligence and espionage-prevention protective net,” carrying out publicity and education to “enhance national counter-intelligence and security awareness and literacy.”[57]
A number of other posts on the account highlight the severity of the overall security challenges facing China, consistent with Xi’s public remarks – warning, for example, that “complexity, severity, and uncertainty of the external environment have increased” and China “faces a grim international situation.”[58] Others follow that discuss the particular risks posed by foreign espionage, even colorfully noting that “The Bourne Supremacy is all around us.”[59] A number highlight specific cases of foreign espionage detected and countered by the MSS, especially attempts by the United States. For example, one early, and more historically oriented post, titled “The First Black Star on the CIA’s Memorial Wall Is Related to China!” describes CIA officer Douglas Mackiernan’s 1950 attempted escape from Xinjiang into Tibet as an example of the party’s ability to “effectively thwart the subversive plots of the CIA.”[60]
These types of posts reflect other public remarks by MSS officials, indicating a perceived increase in the espionage threats faced by the PRC and Chinese society and the view that the MSS plays a frontline and critical role in defending against such threats. In 2021, for example, Deputy Minister Dong Jingwei reported that the number of espionage cases in the economic and financial areas had grown sevenfold during the past five years.[61] Other posts on the weixin account portray the MSS – both historically and in its current work – as a frontline defender against the threats of foreign infiltration, subversion, espionage, and destabilization; these posts often call on members of Chinese society to partner with state security by reporting suspected espionage, and they provide readers with detailed logistical instructions on how to do the reporting. [62] (At other times, the account simply posts, or re-posts, content from other state media or government outlets.)
MSS use of social media appears consistent to be with Chen’s belief that the innovative use of social media is an important tool in the tasks of national/state security education, public opinion guidance, and “winning the online ideological struggle in the political-legal domain.”[63] The account has been an important contributor to MSS visibility for an agency that has few other ways for outsiders to observe its work and impact; it therefore it has played a role in shaping external perceptions of a more publicly prominent and politically powerful MSS.
Foreign Interactions
One area in which Chen Yixin has lower international visibility and activity than other leaders in China’s security apparatus, such as Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, is bilateral or multilateral meetings with foreign counterparts.[64] Based on publicly available sources, Chen appears to engage in less foreign travel and to participate in fewer meetings with foreign leaders. State media, however, do not regularly report on Chen’s meetings or activities with respect to foreign policy, so it is unclear whether such activities are simply not being disclosed when it occurs or whether Chen simply engages in fewer of these kinds of activities.
In November 2023, however, shortly after revision of the Counter-Espionage Law, Chen embarked on a 10-day trip to Southeast Asia, meeting with counterparts in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand to discuss security and intelligence cooperation.[65] State media observed that in Cambodia, “the two sides emphasized the need to deepen pragmatic cooperation in security intelligence to better preserve social stability in China and Cambodia.” Meetings with the Thai National Intelligence Agency were described as oriented toward “jointly ensur[ing] the safety of overseas projects, institutions, and personnel of both countries,” as well as combating cross-border crime, especially telecom fraud.[66]
Chen has also met with his U.S. counterpart, William Burns, then director of the CIA, in the context of what is increasingly described as intensifying, global U.S.-China intelligence competition.[67] The first meeting between Burns and Chen took place in May 2023; at the time, Burns was the highest-level official from the Biden administration to visit the PRC since a Chinese spy balloon overflew the United States and was shot down by U.S. military aircraft.[68] Burns reportedly used the trip to “emphasize the importance of maintaining open lines of communication in intelligence channels” to avoid miscommunication and conflict spirals, according to unnamed U.S. officials quoted by the press at that time. In September 2024, in a public appearance with Richard Moore, head of the UK’s foreign intelligence service MI6, Burns noted he had visited China “twice over the course of the past year” to keep communication channels open, without providing any further details.[69]
About the Contributor
Sheena Chestnut Greitens is associate professor at the University of Texas-Austin, where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is the author of Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions & State Violence under Authoritarianism (Cambridge, 2016) and Politics of the North Korean Diaspora (Cambridge, 2023). For 2024–25, she is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and visiting faculty at the U.S. Army War College’s China Landpower Studies Center. Views expressed herein are solely her own.
Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance from Cameron Waltz.
Notes
[1] “China’s Feared Spy Agency Steps out of the Shadows,” Financial Times, January 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f78c7243-2ff5-4f77-93d0-91c20f6b5548; Harold Thibault, “China’s Intelligence Steps Out of the Shadows,” Le Monde, March 31, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/31/china-s-intelligence-steps-out-of-the-shadows_6666888_4.html; Nectar Gan, “China Sees Foreign Threats ‘Everywhere’ as Powerful Spy Agency Takes Center Stage,” CNN, April 21,2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/21/china/china-spy -agency-public-profile-intl-hnk/index.html.
[2] Julian Barnes and Edward Wong, “In Risky Hunt for Secrets, U.S. and China Expand Global Spy Operations,” New York Times, September 17, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/17/us/politics/us-china-global-spy-operations.html; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “New Leaders in ‘National Security’ after China’s 20th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor 78 (2023), https://www.prcleader.org/post/new-leaders-in-national-security-after-china-s-20th-party-congress.
[3] Calder Walton, Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2023), 8, 13.
[4] Ibid., 21, 495–501. Others estimate 600,000 personnel ; see Gordon Corera, “China’s Spy Threat Is Growing, but the West Has Struggled to Keep Up,” BBC, May 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cmm33rm32veo.
[5] PLA organs have traditionally handled military intelligence. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Intelligence Operations: A Primer (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019); Martin K. Dimitrov, Dictatorship and Information: Authoritarian Regime Resistance in Communist Europe and China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).
[6] Dimitrov, Dictatorship and Information, 241; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “How Does China Think about National Security?” in The China Questions II, ed. Marie Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2022). For documents describing these interlinked threats, see “Document No. 9: How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?” ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation; “Full Text: Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,” Xinhua, November 16, 2021, https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202111/16/content_WS6193a935c6d0df57f98e50b0.html .
[7] Minxin Pei, “Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: The Surveillance Role of China’s MSS and MPS,” China Leadership Monitor 79 (March 2024), https://www.prcleader.org/post/piercing-the-veil-of-secrecy-the-surveillance-role-of-china-s-mss-and-mps, p. 9.
[8] Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 54–55; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “National Security in China after the 20th Party Congress: Trends in Discourse and Policy,” China Leadership Monitor 77 (2023), https://www.prcleader.org/post/national-security-after-china-s-20th-party-congress-trends-in-discourse-and-policy.
[9] Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Intelligence Operations; Dimitrov, Dictatorship and Information; Pei, “Piercing the Veil of Secrecy.”
[10] Dimitrov, Dictatorship and Information, 241; Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 53-54; Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Michael Chase and James Mulvenon, “The Decommercialization of China’s Ministry of State Security,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15, no. 4(2002):481–95.
[11] Pei, “Piercing the Veil of Secrecy,” 8; see also Luo Xiangyi and Chen Youwen, 国家安全行政与管理 [State/National Security Administration and Management] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1994).
[12] Edward Schwarck, “The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System,” Jamestown China Brief 24, no. 22 (November 15, 2024), https://jamestown.org/program/the-power-vertical-centralization-in-the-prcs-state-security-system/.
[13] In 2012, an aide to MSS Deputy Minister Lu Zhongwei was suspected of passing information to the CIA. Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt, and Matt Apuzzo, “Killing CIA Informants, China Crippled US Spying Operations,” New York Times, May 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spies-espionage.html ; “Arrested Spy Compromised China’s U.S. Espionage Network: Sources,” Reuters, June 15, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-espionage-idUSBRE85E06G20120615/. See also “Beijing Voices Concern Over CIA’s Building of Spy Network in China,” CGTN, July 24, 2023, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-07-24/Beijing-voices-concerns-over-CIA-s-building-of-spy-network-in-China-1lHvKyRGHYc/index.html.
[14] Chestnut Greitens, “New Leaders in ‘National Security.’”
[15] “中华人民共和国反间谍法” [Counterespionage Law of the People’s Republic of China], Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress, Xinhua, April 27, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm. English translation at http://en.npc.gov.cn.cdurl.cn/2023-04/26/c_954841.htm; For an article-by-article comparison of the 2014 and 2023 laws, see Jeremy Daum, “Bad As It Ever Was: Notes on the Espionage Law,” China Law Translate, May 2, 2023, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/bad-as-it-ever-was-notes-on-the-espionage-law/.
For context, see Laurie Chen, “China Approves Wide-ranging Expansion of Counter-Espionage Law,” Reuters, April 26, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-passes-revised-counter-espionage-law-state-media-2023-04-26/; State Council Information Office of the PRC, “China Revises Counter-Espionage Law,” Xinhua, April 27, 2023, http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/chinavoices/2023-04/27/content_85257483.htm; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor 59 (2019), https://www.prcleader.org/_files/ugd/10535f_3956a9f198fa43f99ed6f8c5e89889f6.pdf; Yew Lun Tian and James Pomfret, “China’s Return to Global Stage Checked By National Security Focus,” Reuters, May 9, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-return-global-stage-checked-by-national-security-focus-2023-05-08/.
[16] Chun Han Wong and Dan Strumpf, “China Spy Law Adds to Chilling Effect of Detentions,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-expanded-spy-law-adds-to-chilling-effect-of-detentions-ce8cea1a; Liza Lin and Chun Han Wong, “China Increasingly Obscures True State of Its Economy to Outsiders,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-data-security-law-ships-ports-court-cases-universities-11638803230.
[17] “China Unveils Rules Implementing Law for Guarding State Secrets,” Xinhua, July 22, 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202407/22/content_WS669e430ac6d0868f4e8e955a.html. For a good summary of this law’s history and revisions, see NPC Observer, “Law on Guarding State Secrets,” https://npcobserver.com/legislation/law-on-guarding-state-secrets/; Jeremy Daum, “Open Thoughts on the Secrets Law,” China Law Translate, February 27, 2024, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/open-thoughts-on-the-secrets-law/.
[18] William Zheng, “China’s Anti-Espionage Chief Urges Stronger Crackdown Using Legal Tools,” South China Morning Post, June 5, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3222991/chinas-anti-espionage-chief-urges-stronger-crackdown-using-legal-tools.
[19] Chen Yixin, “全面贯彻总体国家安全观” [Comprehensively Implement the Overall State/national Security Concept], Qiushi, April 15, 2024, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-04/15/c_1130109145.htm; see also Chen Yixin, “陈一新：认真学习贯彻《反间谍法》 全面提升国家安全工作法治化水平 [Chen Yixin: Conscientiously Study and Implement the Counter-Espionage Law and Comprehensively Upgrade the Level of Legalization of State Security Work],” 民主与法制 [Democracy and the Legal System], July 12, 2023, https://archive.ph/M29mb.
[20] Schwarck, “The Power Vertical.”
[21] Ibid.
[22] “国安部：去年破获的经济金融领域间谍案件，是5年前的7倍” [Ministry of State Security: The Number of Espionage Cases Discovered Last Year in the Economic and Financial Fields Was Seven Iimes Higher Than That Five Years Ago],中国长安网 [China chang’an net], August 30, 2021, https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2021_08_30_605010.shtml.
[23] Li Ge, “国家安全部举办新提任厅局领导干部培训班强化‘八大领导素能’”[ Ministry of State Security Held a Training Course for Newly Appointed Department/Bureau Leaders to Strengthen the 8 Major Leadership Qualities], MSS weixin, September 25, 2024, http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100007/2024-09/25/content_12746892.shtml.
[24] Nicole Perlroth, “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.,” New York Times, July 19, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html.
[25] “People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action,” July 8, 2024, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-190a; “Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity,” October 24, 2020, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a.
[26] Perlroth, “How China Transformed into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.”
[27] Sarah Krouse, Robert McMillan, and Dustin Volz, “China-Linked Hackers Breach U.S. Internet Providers in New ‘Salt Typhoon’ Cyberattack,” Wall Street Journal, September 26,2024, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-cyberattack-internet-providers-260bd835; Sarah Krouse, Dustin Volz, Aruna Viswanatha, and Robert McMillan, “U.S. Wiretap Systems Targeted in China-Linked Hack,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/tech/cybersecurity/u-s-wiretap-systems-targeted-in-china-linked-hack-327fc63b.
Volt Typhoon, detected earlier in 2024, targeted U.S. critical infrastructure and appeared to be prepositioning for later cyber-attacks that could cripple critical infrastructure; China has called allegations of PRC involvement American “false flag operations” and misinformation. “Report Reveals More Conspiracies behind U.S. ‘Volt Typhoon’ Misinformation Campaign,” Xinhua, October 14, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20241014/addb9a2aba6944a485a900e788f943f0/c.html.
[28] For an overview of Chen’s career prior to his appointment as minister of State Security, see also Chestnut Greitens, “New Leaders in ‘National Security.’”
[29] “温州市委书记陈一新任浙江省委常委” [Wenzhou Municipal Party Secretary Chen Yixin appointed to Zhejiang Provincial Party Standing Committee], December 28, 2014, https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141228/42814774_0.shtml.
[30] “陈一新调任中央政法委委员、秘书长：武汉是我心中最深的烙印 [Chen Yixin transferred to the role of member and secretary-general of the Central Political-Legal Commission: Wuhan is the deepest mark in my heart],” 长江日报微信 [Yangtze River Daily Weixin post], March 24, 2018, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2041750
[31] Jane Cai, “Beijing Pins Hopes on ‘Guy with the Emperor’s Sword’ to Restore Order in Virus-hit Hubei,” South China Morning Post, February 12, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050087/beijing-pins-hopes-guy-emperors-sword-restore-order-coronavirus; “陈一新：打好武汉保卫战要发起总攻” [Chen Yixin: To Protect Wuhan Well, We Must Launch a General Offensive], Xinhua, February 13, 2020, https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/202002/t20200213_454404.shtml.
[32] Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “The Saohei Campaign, Protection Umbrellas, and China’s Changing Political-Legal Apparatus,” China Leadership Monitor 65 (September 2020), https://www.prcleader.org/greitens-1
[33] “中共中央, 国务院发出《关于开展扫黑除恶专项斗争的通知》” [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and State Council Issue “Notice on Carrying Out Special Campaign to Crack Down on Underworld Forces”], Xinhua, January 24, 2018, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-01/24/content_5260130.htm; “陈一新在全国扫黑办第四次主任会议上强调: 把握好 ‘时度效’ 推动全面纵深发展” [Chen Yixin Emphasizes at the 4th Meeting of the National Saohei Office: Grasp “Timeliness/Degree/Efficacy” to Promote Comprehensive, In-depth Development], Jiancha ribao, December 7, 2018, http://www.gd.jcy.gov.cn/zthd/shce/201812/t20181207_2436279.shtml.
[34] William Zheng, “Chinese Official Leading Security Purge ‘May Be On Fast Track to Promotion,’ Analysts Say,” South China Morning Post, July 17, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3093711/chinese-official-leading-security-purge-may-be-fast-track; “全国政法队伍教育整顿试点启动！陈一新,是党中央提出的新要求” [National Political-Legal Team Education-and-Rectification Pilot Program Is Launched! Chen Yixin, This Is a Request Made by the Party Central Committee], 中国长安网 [China chang’an net], July 8, 2020, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/IPpKBo2v494UWM-LBgfKog; “陈一新：来一场刀刃向内、刮骨疗毒式的自我革命” [Chen Yixin: “Bring the Blade of the Knife Inward to Scrape the Bone, Engage in Self-Revolution”], July 9, 2020, http://www.ah.jcy.gov.cn/jctt/202007/t20200709_2872910.shtml.
In 2021, Chen reported on the results of the campaign’s first phase, which included participation by over 2.7 million political-legal officials of various kinds: “陈一新：全国第一批政法队伍教育整顿取得 ‘四个阶段性成效’” [Chen Yixin: Education and Rectification of the First Set of this Country’s Political-legal Ranks Has Achieved “Four Interim Results”], Ministry of Justice/Central Political-Legal Committee, June 10, 2021, http://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/ywzfyw/202106/t20210610_427220.html
[35] “国安部：去年破获的经济金融领域间谍案件，是5年前的7倍.”
[36] “陈一新：认真学习贯彻习近平总书记重要讲话精神，以实际行动迎接党的二十大胜利召开” [Chen Yixin: Conscientiously Study and Implement the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech], Ministry of Public Security, July 30, 2022, https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2253534/n2253535/c8643323/content.html.
[37] “陈一新在全国国家安全机关党风廉政建设视频会议上强调：推动全面从严管党治警向纵深发展” [Chen Yixin Emphasizes at the National State Security Agency Party Conduct and Integrity Construction Video Conference: Advancing Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party and the Police] , January 30 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1756407858432855634&wfr=spider&for=pc.
[38] Chestnut Greitens, “New Leaders in ‘National Security.’”
[39] “陈一新：全面提升厅局长领导水平 加快构建国家安全机关工作新格局” [Chen Yixin: Comprehensively Improve Department/bureau Directors’ Level of Leadership and Accelerate Construction of a New Work Pattern in National Security Agencies], Fazhi ribao [Legal Daily], May 16, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1766019296812214590&wfr=spider&for=pc or http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Personnel_matters/content/2023-05/15/content_8853807.html.
[40] An excerpt reads: “必须坚持把政治安全放在首要位置，坚定维护国家政权安全、制度安全、意识形态安全.” Chen Yixin, “全面贯彻总体国家安全观.”
[41] “China Opens Website to Inform Against Espionage,” Xinhua, April 16, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2018/04/16/content_281476113903384.htm..
[42] Chen Yixin, “全面贯彻总体国家安全观.”
[43] Li Ge, “Ministry of State Security Held a Training Course.”
[44] Lingling Wei, “China Puts Spymaster in Charge of U.S. Corporate Crackdown,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-crackdown-foreign-companies-chen-yixin-9b403893
[45] Vanessa Cai, “China’s Spy Agency Warns Foreign Groups Are Using Consulting ‘As Cover’ to Steal State Secrets,” South China Morning Post, March 28, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3257092/chinas-spy-agency-warns-foreign-groups-are-using-consulting-cover-steal-secrets.
[46] “中华人民共和国反间谍法: 修订适时、适合、适度” [Revision of Counterespionage Law: Timely, Appropriate, Adequate], MSS weixin, January 31, 2024, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/duGbeiTOdv2zeLcmkrmO3Q; “反间谍法:导致 ‘中国营商环境变差’ 纯属污蔑抹黑!” [The Counterespionage Law Leads to “Worsening Business Environment in China”: Nonsense!], MSS weixin, February 1, 2024, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/aKNjI3JYvzxPItqu4SU5mg.
[47] “习近平主持召开二十届中央国家安全委员会第一次会议强调: 加快推进国家安全体系和能力现代化 以新安全格局保障新发展格局” [Xi Jinping Presides over the 1st Meeting of the 20th Central National/State Security Commission, and Emphasized: Accelerate and Advance Modernization of the State Security System and the Capabilities for the New Security Pattern and the New Development Pattern], Renmin ribao, May 31, 2023,
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-05/31/nw.D110000renmrb_20230531_1-01.htm.
[48] “China Marks First National Security Education Day,” CCTV, April 15, 2016, http://english.cctv.com/2016/04/15/VIDEWWAaj9AFAMr9Sr6RjOyH160415.shtml ; “China’s State Security Ministry Issues Posters Ahead of Seventh National Security Education Day,” Global Times, April 13, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1259195.shtml.
[49] “China Releases Guidelines on National Security Education,” China Daily, October 28, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202010/28/WS5f9906a0a31024ad0ba819bd.html; Ministry of Education, “关于加强大中小学国家安全教育的实施意见” [Opinions of the Ministry of Education on the Implementation of Strengthening National Security Education in Universities, Secondary Schools, and Primary Schools], April 9, 2018, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A12/s7060/201804/t20180412_332965.html.
[50] An excerpt reads: “必须坚持把政治安全放在首要位置，坚定维护国家政权安全、制度安全、意识形态安全.” Chen Yixin, “全面贯彻总体国家安全观.”
[51] “陈一新在政法宣传舆论工作调研座谈会上提出 政法新媒体‘三四五六’创新举措”[Chen Yixin Puts Forward “3, 4, 5, 6” Innovative Initiatives for Political-Legal New Media at the Research Symposium on Political-Legal Propaganda and Public Opinion Work], Ministry of Justice of the PRC, May 24, 2018, https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/ywzfyw/202103/t20210329_348151.html.
[52] William Zheng, “China’s Spy Agency Widens Remit As Well as Reach with New WeChat Social Media Account,” South China Morning Post, October 6, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3236728/china-spy-agency-widens-remit-well-reach-wechat-social-media-account; Chestnut Greitens, “National Security After China’s 20th Party Congress.”
[53] “黑猫警长、麦子爷爷、年画娃娃，都为这项工作代言! “ [Black Cat Detective, Grandpa Wheat, and New Year Painting Dolls All Endorse This Work!], MSS weixin, December 20,2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/a2Ibl1dO03GuGPL6WvKl1w.
[54] Chen Yixin, “全面贯彻总体国家安全观.”
[55] Xu Keyue and Liu Caiyu, “China Releases First National Security-themed Comic Series, Adapted From Real-life Cases,” Global Times, January 7, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202401/1304933.shtml.
[56] “反间防谍需要全社会动员!” [Counter-Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Require Whole-of-Society Mobilization!], MSS weixin, July 31, 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/KHGKLZ2q98giMAaJTIVJ3g.
[57] Ibid; “China Wants to Mobilize Entire Nation in Counter-Espionage,” Reuters, August 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-wants-mobilise-entire-nation-counter-espionage-2023-08-01/.
[58] “国家安全机关坚决筑牢经济安全屏障’”[National Security Agencies Resolutely Solidify Economic Security Barriers], MSS weixin, December 14, 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/pOVcm_d82q_cNr6VXqIHsw. On Xi’s threat characterization, see Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm; see also Chen Jianqi and Gao Zugui, “新时代统筹‘两个大局’重要论述的理论意义与实践价值” [The Theoretical Significance and Practical Value of Important Discussion on Coordinating the “Two Overall situations” in the New Era], http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2022/1004/c40531-32539336.html.
[59] “‘包租公’抓间谍,不是误打误撞” [The “Landlord” Did Not Spot a Spy by Accident], MSS weixin, December 27,2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sYNGSDZYL92rktY1rHorrg; see also “‘数字’间谍来自何处?有何招式?” [Where Do “Digital Spies” Come From? What are Their Tactics?], MSS weixin, September 13. 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/XOlhw2TdT19OqvT14GTleA.
[60] “美国中央情报局挂在石墙上的第一颗黑星,与中国有关!” [The First Black Star on the CIA’s Memorial Wall Is Related to China!], MSS weixin, September 4, 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D7TmJwfnV0eMIcD7rITo0A. See also https://www.cia.gov/legacy/headquarters/cia-memorial-wall/.
[61] “国安部：去年破获的经济金融领域间谍案件，是5年前的7倍.”.
[62] “国家安全机关形象宣传片《有我》” [National Security Agency’s Promo Video It’s Me], MSS weixin, August 2, 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LmLP5sIPd6uJRj8111zutA; “公民和组织发现间谍行为怎么办？—国家安全部有关部门负责人答记者问(一)” [What Should Citizens or Organizations Do If They Discover Espionage Activity? MSS Department Head Answers Reporters’ Questions (Part 1)], MSS weixin, August 2, 2023, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4rgNk5urLocFlbRUx3Lyrg.
[63]“陈一新在政法宣传舆论工作调研座谈会上提出 政法新媒体‘三四五六’创新举措.”
[64] For example, both Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Central Political-Legal Commission Chair Chen Wenqing conduct regular high-level diplomatic meetings with counterparts in Russia, Iran, and other places. For a partial list, see Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “China, Regime Security, and Authoritarian Collaboration,” testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 20 February 2025.
[65] Zhang Changyue, “China to Boost Intelligence and Security Cooperation with Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand,” Global Times, November 13, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1301732.shtml
[66] Ibid.
[67] See, for example, Margaret Stromecki, “Intelligence After Next: Meeting the China Challenge—Key Areas of Focus for the Intelligence Community,” Mitre, December 29, 2023, https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/intelligence-after-next-meeting-china-challenge-key-focus-areas.
[68] Nomaan Merchant, “CIA Director William Burns Met Chinese Leaders in Beijing as Washington Tries to Thaw Tensions,” Associated Press, June 2, 2023, https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/cia-director-william-burns-met-chinese-leaders-in-beijing-as-washington-tries-to-thaw-tensions.
[69] Central Intelligence Agency, “DCIA William Burns and Richard Moore, with Financial Times Editor Roula Khalaf,” transcript, September 7, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/static/DCIA_Bill_Burns_MI6_Chief_Richard_Moore_with_FT_Editor_Roula_Khalaf_Transcript.pdf.
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