- China Leadership Monitor
CLM Insights Interview with Oriana Skylar Mastro
Oriana Skylar Mastro. Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. Oxford University Press. July 2024. 336pp. ISBN-10: 019769506X. ISBN-13: 978-0197695067.
Insights Interview
According to your formulation, China’s upstart strategy has three components: emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship. Can you briefly explain what each of them mean and how they complement or conflict with one another?
My upstart strategy has three components defined by the areas of competition and the rising power’s approach: emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship (or the 3E’s). Emulation is when a country competes in the same way as the established hegemon in existing areas of competition. Most of the existing literature focuses on this form of competition; it argues that to become a great power, an ambitious state needs to build and exercise power in an established fashion. The second component, the exploitation of established great powers’ blind spots to make gains, refers to situations in which a rising power adopts approaches like those of the great power but in new areas of competition. For example, China exploits opportunities where competitive forces are the weakest—where the United States is not active or suffers vulnerabilities, where there are cracks in the international order, or where the normative environment is weak. The last component, entrepreneurship, involves taking new approaches in domains of competition, both new and old.
How did this strategy evolve over time? Did you observe substantive differences in terms of the formulation and implementation of the strategy under different leaders?
In the book, I lay out five main factors that shape which of the upstart strategy’s 3Es is pursued: the effectiveness of the established hegemon’s strategy, the hegemon’s most likely interpretation of the behavior, the efficiency of a particular approach (shaped largely by competitive advantages), the liabilities of an approach and the existence of gaps and blind spots. In the case of China’s rise, this has meant China tends to emulate the United States when it assesses the U.S. approach to be effective, when emulative behavior would reassure the Western powers, and when it enjoys competitive advantages in that domain to ensure strategic efficacy. China’s attempts at diplomatic outreach, mediation, participation in international institutions, peacekeeping, and free trade fall into this category. When the first condition holds but China is unable to compete directly because of its own limitations, China identifies gaps to exploit. This is the case in its approach to high-level visits, arms sales, and its anti-access area denial military strategy, for example. Lastly, when a U.S. approach is seen as ineffective, threatening to CCP control, or China is at a competitive disadvantage but there are no gaps to exploit, it tends to choose entrepreneurial approaches. Its reliance on strategic partnerships instead of alliances, regime neutrality instead of democracy promotion, its industrial policy, BRI, gray zone tactics and different approaches to nuclear strategy, and protection of overseas interests are some examples.
This means that while China has continued to rely on the upstart strategy across leaders, as these factors changed so too did China’s specific choice of emulation, exploitation, or entrepreneurship. The major change since 2013 under Xi Jinping was that China was stronger and more capable – meaning that it enjoyed some competitive advantages in direct competition – and became less concerned about causing concern in the United States because the dominant view after the Trump administration was that it was unavoidable. This in turn shifted the balance of the 3Es, and in some cases, it has created the view that emulation would be more strategically effective and efficient and that the negative reaction from the U.S. was unavoidable. China’s shipbuilding and space programs are two such examples.
This does not mean that the U.S. response to Chinese strategic approaches will no longer influence China’s choices. As U.S. policy toward China hardens, China will aim to minimize friction with the U.S. and other developed countries while still pursuing its strategic objectives. U.S. actions, such as sanctions for arms sales, could diminish the attractiveness of China’s exploitative strategies. Moreover, as relations between Russia and the United States and NATO worsen due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China may find strategies such as mediation diplomacy or strengthening its partnership with Moscow more appealing.
It is also crucial to note that China may not follow the U.S. model even when it is capable of doing so. The upstart strategy suggests that if China avoided emulation due to the ineffectiveness of U.S. strategies, it is likely to continue this approach even with improved capabilities. For instance, China is not expected to seek nuclear parity, form traditional military alliances, or build overseas bases. Instead, it will likely continue with entrepreneurial strategies that are seen as more effective and efficient. The greatest potential for change exists when China uses the same strategy but in different competitive areas. Recognizing it lacks a competitive edge for direct competition but seeing these strategies as beneficial, China might focus on high-level diplomacy, arms sales, prioritizing A2/AD over power projection, gray zone tactics, and pushing for control over the international financial system.
The upstart strategy has been applied to foreign policy, military modernization, and economic development. Do you see differences in terms of effectiveness and outcomes across these three domains? What explains such differences if they do exist?
The upstart strategy does not vary in effectiveness across domains, but two points can be made about differences. First, there tends to be greater opportunities for emulation to reassure the United States in the economic and political spaces than in the military space. This is one of the reasons why Deng Xiaoping promoted these areas of modernization before military modernization; besides needing to focus on domestic growth, there was an understanding that military buildups are the most likely to spark threat perceptions. China was entrepreneurial in delaying its military modernization long beyond when other rising powers had shifted focus. For example, on the brink of World War I, Germany and the United Kingdom were spending about the same amount on their militaries (Germany was spending about 6 percent more).[1] During the Cold War, U.S. and USSR defense spending was indicative of their direct competition. The U.S. spent on average 32 percent more than the Soviet Union until 1970, when the Soviet Union took the lead by an average of 26 percent until 1988.[2] In contrast, China’s spending gradually increased, from only 5 percent of total U.S. defense expenditures in 1995 to 8.6 percent of the U.S. budget in 2000, 10.5 percent in 2005, and 14.97 percent in 2010 until 2017, when spending jumped to 32 percent (and has remained stable there since).[3]
Second, in all domains there are examples in which China chose to emulate even though the conditions were not right. In the realm of foreign policy, for example, China’s efforts to construct soft power mirrored the U.S. approach, but it spent considerably more money for little improvement in its image. Similarly, in the military domain, although China initially avoided developing aircraft carriers due to the high costs, the need for advanced technology, and the risk of provoking the U.S., in 2012 China shifted strategies and launched its first carrier, the Liaoning, followed by the Shandong and the more advanced Fujian. However, this emulation decision, driven by a desire for prestige and regional competition came at a predictable price: Chinese carriers still lag behind U.S. capabilities in size, power, and efficiency, and this has increased threat perceptions from the U.S.
Lastly, in the economic realm, China’s attempts to internationalize the renminbi and emulate the U.S. dollar’s dominance have not yet been successful. Domestic factors, such as the closed capital account and underdeveloped financial markets, have hindered RMB internationalization. Although China continues to explore entrepreneurial approaches, such as a digital RMB, the need for strict Party control over the financial system has limited its ability to compete directly with the U.S. dollar. These deviant cases show that China does not always follow the logic of the upstart strategy. This may be due to motivations beyond power, such as the desire for prestige and the need to bolster the CCP at home, which may dominate other strategic considerations and impede China’s ability to compete with the United States. However, when China diverges from the upstart strategy, there are costs involved not only in terms of what they achieve for the resources expended but also in terms of the great power response.
The upstart strategy presumably has worked better when China was at the earlier stages of its rise. When did it start to produce diminishing returns? Why?
I would not necessarily say that the upstart strategy has produced any diminishing returns. Instead, it is more accurate to describe the evolution in the approach as a shift in strategic imperatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Initially, the strategy focused on avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and on quietly building capabilities and influence. However, as China’s global stature has grown, Xi has recognized that maintaining a low profile is no longer as important or beneficial as it once was, and he has shown less concern about provoking the U.S.
Notes
[1] Taken from Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (v6.0), J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing, 1972): 19-48.
[2] Ibid.
[3] China Power Team, “What Does China Really Spend on its Military?” China Power, December 28, 2015, updated May 27, 2021; “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed August 25, 2023, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
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