Michael D. Swaine
Jun 2, 202027 min
Available open sources indicate that in their domestic handling of the COVID-19 virus, the central Chinese authorities generally followed, ultimately to good effect, established crisis management processes and procedures as well as post-SARS regulations for dealing with a health emergency. A major exception to this record occurred with regard to the initial reporting on the virus by both local and central authorities, where the pre-existing network reporting system was not utilized early enough and both local and initial central expert teams sent to Wuhan failed to detect the seriousness of the outbreak. Once the top leadership clearly recognized the gravity of the situation, it moved with at times ruthless efficiency to combat the virus. Although Xi Jinping and other senior officials subsequently acknowledged that mistakes were made, the center only punished local officials, in an apparent attempt to deflect blame from the top, as was also the case during the SARS epidemic. Available open sources provide no clear proof that the more extreme charge of a deliberate cover-up of a known deadly and highly contagious outbreak is accurate. However, they do indicate that the Chinese system remains excessively bureaucratic and consensus-driven, often prizing political criteria over expert-based information and reflexively suppressing unauthorized communications.
This is the first of two essays analyzing the COVID-19 outbreak as a case study in a certain type of Chinese crisis management, i.e., an unconventional, prolonged health threat of domestic origins with broad ramifications for Chinese security and PRC regime legitimacy both at home and abroad. The current essay (Part One) focuses on domestic management of the health dimensions of the crisis, with, for reasons of length, far less attention to the economic dimensions. The second essay (Part Two), to appear in the next issue of CLM, focuses on the international dimensions of China’s crisis management efforts, in particular the deepening dispute with the United States.
The analysis covers the period from early/mid-December 2019, when the virus was probably first detected in Wuhan, to mid-April 2020, when it had been largely brought under control within China, at least for the time being. Throughout, the focus is on the perceptions and actions of the central party and government leaderships in managing the crisis, albeit often through interactions with local officials.
In their efforts to manage the COVID-19 crisis, Chinese authorities clearly wanted to achieve certain objectives both domestically and internationally. Within China, the challenge was to quell the outbreak and maintain public support for the regime while avoiding sowing panic and disorder in society or deeply damaging the economy. Internationally, the Chinese authorities wanted to elicit as much assistance as possible from the outside, minimize any foreign obstruction and criticism, and in general perform in ways that would preserve, or, if possible, increase, the status of the Chinese government.
In many respects, the Chinese government’s handling of COVID-19 followed a pattern of crisis management behavior witnessed in previous national crises, both domestic and international ones, albeit with some specific variations. This pattern involves a particular type of decision making by various types of leadership groups and institutions (both pre-existing and those formed in response to the crisis) as well as, in the case of a pathogen, a set of diagnostic and reporting rules and regulations.
On the broadest level, as a first step, relevant local authorities will provide information on the initial details of the crisis (e.g., what happened, who was involved, etc.) to the relevant central authorities, using established bureaucratic channels. These channels can vary depending on the nature of the crisis (domestic, health- or weather-related, external, involving civilian and/or military actors, etc.) and they can be more or less formalized.[2] In a health emergency, specific regulations exist, most established after the SARS epidemic of 2002–3, for diagnosing, responding to, and reporting information on a pathogen (see below).
Second, in domestic crises, once notified, the relevant central authorities will usually send down one or more investigation teams to confirm reported information, report new information upward, and provide guidance. They will also likely send down supervisory teams or individuals to oversee local coordination of the crisis management efforts and ensure compliance with the central directives. In the case of a health crisis, these activities can involve the creation of initial guidelines to be used by local medical personnel and relevant government and propaganda officials in dealing with the specific crisis.
At some point in this early reporting and response process, an authoritative central figure with responsibility for the crisis area will decide whether or not to inform the senior political leadership about the crisis. If the decision is made to inform the senior leadership, or the senior leadership has already picked up information on the crisis via the media or via its own informal channels, the senior leadership will then decide whether and how to respond.
How the senior leadership responds depends in part on the information it receives from investigation teams and/or local political officials; this usually occurs only after an agreement has been reached among the senior leaders regarding the seriousness of the crisis, the stakes involved, and so forth. As part of this process, the senior political leadership (or the senior leader alone) will designate a responsible senior person to oversee the crisis and to report to the rest of the leadership as the crisis evolves. This person is usually the head of a senior policy coordination, supervision, or decision-making group within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership structure that either already exists or is formed to deal with the crisis—usually a leading small group (LSG).[3]
As the crisis evolves, the central authorities will adjust their directives and interactions with the local authorities based on established metrics for success and other information received from expert teams, investigation units, and regular party and state organs overseeing their local counterparts.
Also, throughout the crisis, propaganda officials, the Chinese media, and senior leaders will present an approved narrative to the Chinese public and the outside world on the nature of the crisis and the success of the government in handling it. This will also involve efforts to stifle counter-narratives from the public and elsewhere.
In the case of the outbreak of an unknown and potentially lethal and highly communicable disease, the above crisis management response process is in theory, at least initially, to be implemented on the basis of an explicit, formalized set of procedures and regulations. These procedures dictate that the State Council, the supreme government (as opposed to the party) executive authority in China, has primary responsibility for handling the emergency.[4] This can include the creation of nationwide response command centers and expert committees at every level of government, usually organized by the National Health Commission (NHC) under the State Council. At the national level, this command center can include representatives of relevant ministries, bureaus, and offices under the State Council as well as departments of the military, depending on the nature of the crisis.
In a public health emergency, such as the outbreak of an infectious disease, a direct reporting system from the localities to the center is also employed. This system, called “China’s direct network reporting system for infectious diseases and public health emergencies” (中国传染病疫情和突发公共卫生事件网络直报系统) was put in place after the SARS epidemic of 2002–3. Infectious cases discovered by medical institutions at all levels are to be directly transmitted to the Central Data Center of the China CDC through the internet. In the case of “pneumonia with unknown causes,” medical institutions are required to organize expert groups to diagnose the disease within twelve hours, and they should report to the system immediately if the diagnosis is still unclear.[5]
As the above suggests, successfully managing an unknown pathogen involves many moving parts, with obstructions and missteps possible throughout the process due to a variety of factors, including overly strict and repressive controls by responsible local and central authorities, inadequate and inflexible plans and procedures, unclear lines of authority and communication, excessive political interference by individuals or agencies, perceptual biases, and sheer incompetence. Given such complexities and varied factors, it is virtually inevitable that mistakes will be made in the management of such a crisis, and in the case of COVID-19 the Chinese regime made several key mistakes, while it also achieved certain notable successes, as shown below.
The findings here cover two separate but related sets of crisis management activities. The first section describes Beijing’s initial response to the outbreak by both central health officials and agencies and the political leadership. This response includes interactions with local counterparts in Wuhan and Hubei province in diagnosing the pathogen, alerting the system to the danger, and developing and/or implementing a strategy for managing it locally. The second section covers the actions by the central authorities in developing and implementing an overall national plan for limiting and eventually suppressing the outbreak, punishing wrongdoing, getting the Chinese economy up and running again, and revising such an approach over time as events evolve. As part of this process, the leadership role of Xi Jinping was of course stressed.
Initial Pathogen Detection and Response
The Chinese response to the COVID-19 virus involved several overlapping activities, including the detection of the unknown pathogen in Wuhan (called at that time an “unknown pneumonia,” as per existing regulations), local efforts to diagnose or classify it, the initial reporting to the central health authorities, subsequent updates regarding diagnosis and reporting, initial attempts to control how the virus was being revealed to the public and handled by laboratories, and eventual recognition of the gravity of the situation by the central leadership that led to the phase-two period of a heightened response to combat the virus. These actions all occurred from early/mid-December to January 20.
An examination of available Chinese and English sources during this initial period of detection and response reveals several key features of the system. First, the pre-existing “direct network reporting system” outlined above apparently was not utilized, or was utilized very slowly, to inform the central health authorities of the new pathogen. During an initial period (of approximately 2–3 weeks in early/mid-December) of detection by local hospitals of patients appearing with an unknown pneumonia, hospital authorities apparently failed to report upward through the system within the required twelve-hour period.
Perhaps in response to this failure or merely to obtain more information on the virus and immediate reactions from other professionals, local doctors initially sent samples of the pathogen to private laboratories and began to discuss the pathogen on closed social media platforms. One of these private labs (Vision Medicals) reportedly shared its data with the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. It is unclear whether or how that central authority responded to this report.[6] In addition, local health authorities apparently did not send samples of the illness to the China CDC until January 2, or possibly as late as January 8.[7]
These activities apparently took place outside of the “direct network reporting system.” Local municipal and provincial health authorities were not informed of the illness until the end of the month (probably on December 27), when Hubei Xinhua Hospital notified the Disease Control Department of the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission (WMHC) and the Hubei Provincial Government; the response was that apparently the illness had a connection with the nearby seafood market.[8]
The NHC was supposedly not notified about the illness until December 30.[9] Sources suggest that Gao Fu, head of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (i.e., China’s national CDC), under the NHC, found out about the illness only by reading the WMHC’s leaked online internal emergency notices.[10] In response, Gao “…asked the Wuhan CDC head why it had never reported directly to the direct network reporting system for so many days.”[11]
Notably, none of the local sources discussing these early notifications mentioned any use of the “national direct network reporting system.”
In contrast, a second feature of this early period shows compliance by the central authorities with established regulations for responding to the detection of a pathogen. On January 1, the NHC took its first substantive action by establishing a leading group on epidemic response (疫情应对处置领导小组) “…to discuss and analyze development and changes in the epidemic, study and deploy prevention and control strategies and measures, and provide timely guidance and support to Hubei province and Wuhan City.”[12] It also organized at least two expert groups to immediately send to Wuhan to work directly with the local authorities.[13]
These two expert groups apparently interacted with the Wuhan health authorities and epidemiologists during the following weeks to try to determine the nature of the new virus, how communicable it was, and therefore how best to treat it and prevent its possible spread. This behavior all generally accords with the existing crisis procedures summarized above.
By January 7, according to the WHO, Chinese officials announced they had identified a new virus.[14] On the following day, as shown by the timeline later released by People’s Daily, the NHC examined the virus specimen and confirmed that a new type of coronavirus was the cause of this epidemic.[15]
A third feature of the initial response consisted of efforts by both local and central authorities to control the unauthorized release of information about the illness, possibly in response to the above-mentioned online discussions by staff at hospitals and labs, and perhaps as a result of the leak of the WHMC emergency notices that Gao Fu had read online.
In the above-mentioned emergency notice of December 30 warning of the illness, the WHMC cautioned individuals or units about releasing information without authorization.[16] This notice was apparently the grounds for detaining Li Wenliang, the now-famous doctor who discussed the illness online, was subsequently punished (along with others) for doing so, forced to sign a statement denouncing his warning as an unfounded and illegal rumor, subsequently died from the virus, and was posthumously exonerated after a national uproar over his treatment by the authorities.[17] This censorship effort was expanded and duplicated at the national level beginning at the latest by January 1.[18]
As part of the effort to control information, on December 30 local health authorities also began telling private labs to stop testing samples from the new disease, to cease releasing test results and information about the tests, and to report any future results to the authorities.[19] This directive was apparently repeated on January 3 by the NHC in a general notice that circulated online.[20] Therefore, central authorities were clearly involved in this effort. This decision apparently reflected a desire by central and local health authorities to ensure that testing of the virus was being conducted in qualified labs with full safety facilities.
A fourth feature of the initial response was the existence of overly strict diagnostic criteria and rigid level-by-level bureaucratic approval requirements that apparently slowed the detection and reporting process. In late December/early January, local authorities developed a so-called
“white” manual diagnostic and treatment plan for the virus, apparently issued by the WMHC. This plan reportedly included an overly strict requirement for any reporting of the illness, requiring an “epidemiological contact history” for any confirmed case, and such criteria were to be instructed only via “…phone calls, face-to-face, or WeChat voice messages.”[21]
In addition, apparently contrary to the established “direct reporting” procedures, health experts at the hospital, district, municipal, and provincial levels were required by local authorities to examine suspected cases before they could be reported as confirmed cases.[22] Wuhan health officials reportedly continued to stress that any reporting on the virus must be done “carefully” and only via the proper level-by-level process.[23] Later, health expert Zhong Nanshan, made famous by his handling of the SARS epidemic, stated that reporting upward and outward to the public suffered from the fact that the status of the China CDC within the Chinese system as a mere technical department under the NHC was too low. It was required to report “level by level” and was prohibited from communicating directly to the public. NHC expert Wang Guangfa also stated that “…judgment about the epidemic was not made by individuals but by collectives.”[24]
The fifth feature of this early period (and a possible reflection of several of the above features) was the fact that, over several weeks in early/mid-January, both local and central (i.e., WNHC and NHC) health authorities publicly reported variations of the message that there was either no or very limited evidence of human-to-human transmission of the new virus, and no medical workers were infected.[25] Even as late as January 19, both local and central experts were quoted by state media as saying the disease could be prevented and controlled (可防可控).[26]
That is to say, health authorities were not discounting the possibility of human-to-human transmission, but apparently they did not conclusively think that such transmission was rapid.[27] It is also worth mentioning that the first COVID patient did not die from the disease until January 11, which might explain some of the caution displayed by the local authorities.[28] Nonetheless, these statements seem at the very least to be hugely optimistic, given the authoritative finding on January 7 (above) that the virus was a SARS-like virus, which suggests that it was potentially very dangerous and to some extent communicable.
In fact, during this entire period in early/mid-January, several local doctors in hospitals were telling their superiors that they believed the virus was likely being transferred among humans. Yet this information was reportedly being blocked by local security and health authorities.[29]
Many observers have alleged that the above pattern of behavior by both national- and local-level authorities is clear proof of a damaging cover-up, undertaken to conceal the real origins and nature of the virus (e.g., possibly a highly contagious and fast-moving pathogen created in a Chinese virus lab) or to otherwise destroy evidence of incompetence or malicious intentions.[30] In fact, it remains unclear why local hospitals apparently failed to notify Wuhan and Hubei health authorities until perhaps December 27 and why those local authorities in turn failed to notify the central health authorities before December 30. It is also unclear why the local authorities delayed providing samples to the national CDC, or why they (and the central health authorities) did not conclude internally and earlier inform the public that the illness was spreading from human to human, despite the January 7 conclusion that it was a coronavirus similar to SARS.
The autocratic Chinese political system discourages lower-level authorities from conveying bad news upward, without prior approval or encouragement, out of fear that such news will invite criticism and punishment for themselves. That could certainly have played a role here, although there is no evidence of this in the sources examined for this essay. At the same time, the somewhat chaotic and panic-driven reaction to the SARS epidemic of 2002–3 arguably reinforced the need for the authorities to strictly control information and to ensure the accuracy of any reporting of a new pathogen by acting only on the basis of clear guidelines or diagnostic criteria and a clear consensus among experts. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, the overly strict diagnostic criteria initially employed almost certainly resulted in a much lower level of official reporting of virus cases by doctors and hospitals. In addition, the rigidly bureaucratic features of the system generally required level-by-level approvals of upward information, despite health regulations calling for rapid reporting.
Some of the sources at least suggest (if not confirm) that both local and national officials were motivated in December and early/mid-January to control information, suppress expanding unauthorized online discussions, and order the destruction of samples of the virus. Perhaps they were driven by a desire to prevent criticism of the Chinese government and/or to avoid sowing panic among the public; or perhaps they wanted to reduce contamination and deaths and ensure accurate test results by stipulating that only qualified labs could receive the samples. In addition, the fact that huge numbers of Chinese were moving around China at that time as part of the Spring Festival might have deterred local officials from taking radical actions to stop such movements without rock-solid confirmation of the nature of the virus. These factors certainly could have slowed response time and might have led to intimidation and punishment of those who sought to report upwards. Thus, taken as a whole, all of the above bureaucratic, personnel, and procedural factors, not a malicious “cover-up” of a known deadly and highly contagious pathogen per se, might best explain the initial response by local and NHC authorities to the virus.
In any event, the sixth feature of this period saw an abrupt and radical shift in the reaction of the central authorities to the COVID-19 virus, precipitated by information conveyed to senior political leaders by a very senior NHC expert group (国家卫健委高级别专家组) dispatched to Wuhan on January 18.[31] It is possible that this group was dispatched because the central health authorities on the scene had become suspicious of the optimistic local reporting summarized above.[32] Led by highly regarded specialists Zhong Nanshan and Li Lanjuan, the group determined in short order that the disease was spreading rapidly from person-to-person.[33] Zhong confirmed this fact publicly in an interview on January 20.[34]
After returning from Wuhan, the senior expert group, along with the head of the NHC and the governor of Hubei province, reported their views to Vice Premier Sun Chunlan (the State Council official responsible for public health) and then to a State Council Executive Meeting (国务院常务会议) chaired by Li Keqiang.[35]
The meeting reportedly accepted the reports of the experts and officials about the seriousness of the epidemic, including Li Lanjuan’s advice to employ a “no entry, no departure” policy in Wuhan. In response, the meeting participants decided to create a high-level central, multi-agency coordination work mechanism to manage joint prevention and control of the virus.[36] This mechanism, called the State Council Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism (or Task Force) (国务院联防联控机制), was under the leadership of Vice Premier Sun Chunlan.[37]
In the afternoon of January 20, the first high-level expert report on the virus was released to the public. On that day, the State Council and the NHC (involving Vice Premier Sun and presumably the head of the NHC) held a national video and telephone conference regarding the epidemic and established some broad requirements for national joint defense and joint control.[38]
All these moves were generally in line with the established procedures as outlined above. The decisions and actions were described by state media as “following the requirements by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang.”[39] On January 20, Xi Jinping for the first time publicly commented on the epidemic, issuing brief instructions through the state media to resolutely curb the spread of the virus. Xi reportedly stated that “…prevention and control work is crucial at the moment due to the large passenger flows during the Spring Festival holiday.” He also stressed the need for the timely release of information and a deepening of international cooperation.[40] This message, likely issued to reinforce the decisions and actions taken on January 20, hinted at problems in information flows about the virus. Of course, the message showed no awareness that “passenger flows” during the Spring Festival were already spreading the virus.
These instructions reportedly followed an internal speech to the Politburo Standing Committee given by Xi on January 7, in which he supposedly “issued demands about efforts to prevent and control” the coronavirus.[41]
By this time, criticism of the slow official response to the virus and charges of a cover-up had already gained considerable momentum among netizens and undoubtedly among experts and officials, given the huge gap between statements on human-to-human transmission by Zhong Nanshan on January 20 and the statements made by both WMHC and NHC officials before then. Indeed, on January 22, both experts and officials of the NHC attempted to respond to these criticisms, denying, during the first public NHC press briefing on the virus, that they or the local authorities had been slow in reporting on the virus.[42] On January 27, Wuhan’s mayor acknowledged that the local authorities did not disclose relevant information in a timely manner, but he insisted that he did not know the seriousness of the situation at the time and he was limited by law (and presumably health regulations) in releasing information.[43]
Nonetheless, on January 24, the State Council issued the “Announcement on the Collection of Clues and Suggestions for Epidemic Control Work,” stating that when confirmed, “concealment” of the epidemic would be treated seriously.[44]
The Center Takes Command, Rectifies Local Officials, and Implements a Strategy
The period from January 20 to mid-April constitutes a second phase in the center’s efforts to manage the rapidly growing COVID-19 epidemic. It involved five additional features of the overall crisis management process: a further tightening and strengthening of central control, investigation and punishment of local officials, concerted efforts to stress the leadership role of Xi Jinping during the crisis, greater attention to the economic impact of the crisis and the formulation of a comprehensive strategy, and adjustments to this strategy in light of further developments.
Once the senior leadership had grasped the seriousness of the epidemic, it moved in a variety of ways to strengthen its control and coordination of the national crisis management effort, reinforcing the initial moves by the State Council, Li Keqiang, and Sun Chunlan in the government/health administration arena and by Xi Jinping at the top of the leadership.
On January 22, Sun Chunlan arrived in Wuhan and issued orders in the name of Xi Jinping to lock down the city and extend the Spring Festival holiday in order to prevent individuals from traveling home.[45]
Three days later, on January 25, Xi Jinping chaired a PBSC meeting and made the decision to establish a central leading small group for handling the epidemic (中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组) (hereafter, “Coronavirus Leading Small Group,” or CLSG) under the leadership of the PBSC and the command of Premier Li Keqiang.[46] In addition to Li Keqiang, the eight other CLSG members were from either the Politburo or the CCP Central Committee.
As suggested above, the formation of this LSG was in line with past practices for managing crises, both domestic and foreign. As with other LSGs under the PBSC, the CLSG serves primarily as the most senior coordinating and supervisory body over the agencies responsible for dealing with the issue at hand. However, in comparison with the SARS LSG created by the State Council in April 2003, the CLSG has fewer members, is of a far higher party rank, lacks any health specialists or experts in epidemics, and is directly under the PBSC. The members consist of senior officials responsible for party/government administration, coordination, and propaganda, but there are no military representatives.[47]
Given the high sensitivity and public impact of the epidemic, it is no surprise that propaganda officials are included in the CLSG to supervise the public narrative and senior administrative officials. Given the existence of the Joint Mechanism or Task Force under Sun Chunlan (noted above), it is no surprise that no health officials sit on the CLSG. It is a little surprising, however, that no PLA leaders are present, given the large mobilization of PLA medical resources that occurred.[48] It is also notable, if not surprising, that unlike most LSGs, the CLSG has a relatively high public profile, presumably in order to show the public that the central authorities were energetically responding and in charge.
As noted in footnote 26, the CDC had issued internally a Level I emergency response on January 15. By January 25, many cities around the country had also implemented a Level I response. Reserved for major urgent public health incidents, the response confirmed that the State Council would take over responsibility for the medical response, information dissemination, scientific research, international exchange and cooperation, emergency supplies and facility management, and logistics; it would also oversee inspections. This response also indicated that local governments should follow the measures determined by the central government, thus placing total control over the epidemic in the direct hands of the central authorities. [49]
As part of its crisis management actions, the central government began to address the economic impact of the virus.[50] Central authorities also began to control the allocation of medical supplies, apparently warning local officials not to interfere.[51] However, this top-down control led to bottlenecks and shortages, as well as charges of corruption leveled at the Chinese Red Cross and other aid agencies (see below).
The second feature of this stage of the crisis management effort involved examination and punishment of local officials. The focus of the central leadership on this issue was indicated by the formation, under the CLSG, of a “central guidance group” (中央指导组) directed by Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, which includes Chen Yixin, a supposed protégé of Xi Jinping.[52] This entity clearly was created to establish firm central control over the handling of the virus in Hubei, perhaps partly in response to both the size of the virus challenge and partly in order to correct any of the now-recognized reporting problems exhibited in late December and early/mid- January. In addition, it was undoubtedly established to mollify the growing public criticism of the handling of the virus—including the suppression of individuals who initially reported it, in particular Dr. Li Wenliang. The group, which arrived in Wuhan on January 27, reportedly also played a major role in addressing the severe shortage of medical supplies in Wuhan.[53]
By early February, the central authorities began removing hundreds of officials and issuing punishments.[54] This rapid central response intensified after February 7, when Dr. Li died from COVID-19, setting off an even greater firestorm of criticism of the authorities among the public, with many attacking the local authorities for violating the free speech of Dr. Li and other doctors. The punishment of local officials culminated on February 13 with the removal of Hubei Party Secretary Jiang Chaoliang and Wuhan Party Secretary Ma Guoqiang.[55] As part of their rectification effort, Chinese authorities also moved to punish those responsible, especially in the Hubei Red Cross, for corruption in the handling of medical supplies.[56]
Apparently, no central official has been punished for mishandling the COVID-19 epidemic, despite the complicity of NHC officials in repeating the overly optimistic reports on human-to-human transmission in early/mid-January. Moreover, the removal of local party and health officials echoes what occurred in China during the SARS epidemic although central officials were also punished in the latter case. In April 2003, the health minister and the mayor of Beijing were both fired amid allegations of a cover-up in reporting the extent of the disease.[57]
A third, critical feature of this latter phase of the crisis management effort was a concerted campaign to present Xi Jinping as in direct control of the entire handling of the COVID-19 epidemic. On January 28, Xi met with WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and reportedly stated that he was “personally commanding” the response to the outbreak.[58] Several days later, on February 3, Xi gave a major speech to the PBSC, which had begun to meet very frequently to discuss prevention and control efforts.[59]
In his speech (published several days later in the CCP’s bimonthly journal Qiushi and featured on state television and in other official media), Xi indicated that he had begun issuing instructions relating to the virus on January 7 and that the epidemic had been his top priority from January 23 onward.[60] He described the battle against the epidemic as a “people’s war,” while acknowledging that the effort to combat the epidemic would hurt the economy and slow trade. He also stressed the importance of controlling the narrative and winning over public opinion both at home and abroad. At the end of the speech, Xi criticized some local officials’ practice of “formalism and bureaucracy” as well as their lack of basic knowledge about the “situation on epidemic prevention and control”; and he vowed to punish the guilty.[61]
The relatively rapid publication of Xi’s February 3 speech, his remarks criticizing local officials, and the emphasis on the specific date when he began to direct the national response were unusual—probably designed in part to deflect criticism away from himself and the central government. In fact, as indicated above, some NHC officials had parroted the statements made in early/mid-January by local officials that at the time there were no or very few signs of human-to-human transmission. Yet the central government sought to ensure that any blame for the missteps during the runup to January 20 fell solely on the shoulders of local officials.
Xi furthered his efforts to show his leadership over the handling of the virus on February 5, when he called for a “…severe crackdown on illegal activities and crimes ranging from resisting epidemic prevention and control efforts, assaulting medical workers, manufacturing and selling fake products, to rumor-mongering.”[62] Finally, a videoconference on February 10 with officials in Wuhan was Xi’s first public appearance since the epidemic began; he also inspected a neighborhood in Beijing as the capital increased efforts to contain the spread of the virus.[63]
While strengthening central control, punishing local officials, and touting Xi’s supposed overall early direction of the “people’s war” against COVID-19, the central authorities issued the first authoritative central edict on how both to attack the epidemic and to manage a reopening of the Chinese economy. On February 9, the State Council published the “Notice on Effectively Strengthening the Scientific Prevention and Control of the Epidemic and Resuming Production in an Orderly Manner.” This document stressed the need to “… solve the difficulties and problems during resuming normal production as soon as possible.”[64] On February 12, in yet another PBSC meeting held on the virus, the leadership signaled efforts to at least partially reopen economically those regions less struck by the virus, while requiring “…greater efforts to reduce the impact of prevention and control measures.”[65]
Xi Jinping spoke more extensively on the struggle to handle COVID-19 and to revive the Chinese economy on February 23. At a very large work meeting presided over by Li Keqiang and teleconferenced “…to every county government and every military regiment throughout the country…,” Xi stressed both the continued grim spread of the virus across China and its heavy toll on the economy.[66]
At the same time, Xi sought to characterize these challenges as short-term and eminently manageable, while arguing that events had proven that “…the CPC Central Committee's judgment on the situation on the epidemic is accurate, all work arrangements are timely, and the measures taken are effective.”[67] This of course was not true. As shown above, the party-led system had clearly failed to adequately detect and respond to the severity of the virus infection for approximately one crucial month, from mid-December to mid-January.
To some extent, Xi seemed to acknowledge this, stating in the same February 23 speech “…the country needs to learn from the ‘obvious shortcomings exposed’ in its response, so it can improve its ability to handle future crises.”[68] This is the closest to an admission of the major missteps taken in the initial handling of the crisis that Xi has given.
Finally, from late February to April, when the virus began to recede significantly (at least for the time being), the Chinese central authorities, in coordination with the local authorities, continued to adjust their policies and approaches to strike the right balance between continuing to control the epidemic through various (sometimes draconian) means and minimizing the inevitably negative impact on the economy, while deflecting or suppressing criticism of the regime’s handling of the virus.
The major leadership organizations involved in this effort continued to include the PBSC under Xi Jinping (for general programmatic statements and instructions), the party-directed CLSG under Li Keqiang, its subordinate organ under Sun Chunlan (for more specific actions to combat the virus, such as to expand the use of testing kits), and various economic agencies under the State Council.[69]
For its part, the propaganda apparatus on February 26 published a large book in Chinese and English on the PRC regime’s handling of the COVID-19 epidemic, “…to show the strength of the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership and China’s socialist system, as well as China’s efforts in strengthening cooperation with the international community to jointly safeguard global and regional public health security.”[70] At the same time, the regime increased its efforts to suppress unauthorized commentary about the virus, shut down news sites, and fight back against calls in the aftermath of the Li Wenliang episode for greater free speech. During this period, journals such as Caixin published exposés of “…government coverups and failures in the health care system,” albeit only by local officials and authorities.[71]
By the end of March and early April, the draconian but highly effective lock-down measures undertaken by the regime since January 23 had succeeded in greatly reducing the spread of the virus. At that time, the regime turned much of its attention to limiting immigration into China as the number of domestic COVID cases declined significantly.[72]
During this period, Xi largely continued to oversee the entire effort, make speeches, and issue instructions. His remarks were at times apparently intended to assuage public anger by recognizing the need to improve the handling of the virus. For example, on March 2 he called for greater research on COVID-19 and “…overcoming major difficulties in epidemic prevention and control at an earlier date.”[73] On March 10, accompanied by Wang Huning, Xi finally visited Wuhan and announced that prevention and control efforts had “turned the tide.”[74] In a subsequent teleconference, he demanded efforts to fix “shortcomings and weak links as soon as possible.”[75] At an early April PBSC meeting, as signs appeared that the contagion was ebbing within China, Xi called for “unremitting efforts” to guard against a resurgence of the outbreak.[76]
Implications for PRC Governance and Crisis Management
The above analysis suggests that, in its broad outlines, the central Chinese authorities managed the COVID-19 crisis in a manner similar to the general pattern seen in other crises, both domestic and foreign. With some important exceptions, the authorities followed the way dictated by pre-existing regulations and procedures for dealing with a health emergency.
Central health authorities received information on the outbreak from local authorities, dispatched expert teams to consult and confirm the findings, and thereafter the most senior among these teams reported to the top leadership, confirming the presence of human-to-human transmission of the virus. The senior leadership then established several organizations to direct, oversee, and coordinate the crisis response, under the direct executive authority of the State Council (as per existing regulations) and under the ultimate control of the PBSC. These included the CLSG under the party and the State Council’s Joint Mechanism or Task Force as well as other leading groups and organs under the NHC and relevant bodies.
In the midst of rising popular criticism of the government’s initial handling of the virus, the leadership also formed a “central guidance group” under the CLSG and other groups to ensure direct control over Hubei’s handling of the virus and to examine possible malfeasance. It then moved to lock down Hubei and subsequently other parts of the country while it developed a plan to combat the virus and protect or restore the economy. Relevant leading ministries and subordinate agencies then implemented and adjusted the plan in light of changing circumstances. By early March, the virus was beginning to abate significantly.
The major exception to China’s otherwise generally standard handling of the COVID-19 crisis was the initial reporting by both local and central authorities, when the pre-existing network reporting system established after the SARS outbreak in 2002–3 was not utilized early enough and initial NHC expert teams sent to Wuhan (along with local health authorities) failed to detect the seriousness of the outbreak. Only after a more senior expert team led by Zhong Nanshan traveled to Wuhan on January 18 did the center recognize the danger. In this sense, the system clearly failed, losing much precious time to quell the outbreak.
One deliberate misstep is that although Beijing proceeded to investigate the reporting delay, and Xi Jinping and other senior officials subsequently acknowledged that mistakes were made, the center punished only local officials, in an apparent attempt to deflect blame on the top. This effort was reinforced by Xi Jinping’s statements heaping blame on local officials and by the regime’s attempt to show Xi taking decisive command of the anti-COVID-19 campaign after January 20. To be clear, local officials were greatly to blame in mishandling the crisis, but the center was also complicit in repeating the overly optimistic local reporting. And yet, once the top leadership clearly recognized the gravity of the situation, it moved with at times ruthless efficiency to suppress the outbreak.
Nevertheless, much controversy continues to surround Beijing’s handling of COVID-19, including charges of cover-up, deception, and either malign intent or autocratic arrogance in suppressing information on the virus and punishing health officials. The analysis in this essay relies almost exclusively on Chinese open sources, so one cannot say with assurance that what these sources reveal is accurate, given the regime’s control over its media and reporting system. But, as indicated above, the available evidence from these sources offers no proof that the more extreme charge of a deliberate cover-up of a known deadly and highly contagious outbreak (presumably because of a fear to report bad news upward) is accurate. Several other factors might explain the failure of the system, including a refusal to take the risk of disrupting a huge holiday without iron-clad evidence, overly strict diagnostic criteria in reporting cases, rigid adherence to a consensus-based, level-by-level approval process run by politically sensitive health officials, and the apparent willingness of initial NHC experts on the scene to follow the lead of their local counterparts and not to dig deeper.
In any event, the Chinese handling of the COVID-19 crisis clearly shows both the strengths and weaknesses of Beijing’s crisis management system. Despite post-SARS reforms designed to expedite accurate reporting upward, the system remains excessively bureaucratic and consensus-driven, often prizes political criteria over expert-based information, fails to honestly acknowledge central errors, and reflexively suppresses unauthorized communications of virtually any type. Yet despite these significant shortcomings, the system also has standard, thorough, and well-organized crisis management practices that, once set in motion, in general operate very effectively (despite problems of ineptitude and corruption in places). Thus, other nations, including the United States, should draw both positive and negative lessons from the Chinese experience.
About the Contributor
Michael Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs and many journal articles and book chapters in these areas, directs several security-related projects with Chinese partners, and advises the U.S. government on Asian security issues. He received his doctorate in government from Harvard University.
Photo credit: China News Service (中国新闻网), CC BY 3.0